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ABSTRACT 
Safety is one of the most important areas of focus in the minerals industry. Queensland’s 
metalliferous mines and quarries have experienced 1081 fatalities over the last 139 years, many 
of which had recurring causes and all of which were preventable. Recurring mistakes and 
fatalities can result in financial, political, trade union and social consequences for companies 
and the only way that the cycle of recurring fatalities can be broken, is by learning from 
historical failures and preventing their recurrence.  
This project analysed historical fatality data by examining over 21 different influencing 
parameters to identify common hazards, causation factors and activities that result in the 
recurrence of fatalities. The intended purpose of this study is to enable the minerals industry to 
identify key areas where safety performance can be improved.  
The analysis revealed that Safety and Health Legislation seem to have positively impacted upon 
the safety performance of the industry by reducing both the quantity and variation of annual 
fatal accidents to a level where a single fatality per year is now regularly achieved. 
Multiple data trends and clusters identified a range of fatality causation patterns: Zinc-Lead-
Silver and Copper-Gold were found to be the most fatal commodities mined with Mount Isa 
Mines accounting for the single most site-specific fatalities, normalised fatality data indicated 
that surface fatalities were 10 % more likely than underground fatalities, mid-week days and 
Fridays dominated fatality trends possibly pointing to mental fatigue and distractions, 
equipment operators represent the occupation most at risk of fatal accidents with LHD operators 
particularly susceptible and gravity was determined to be the most hazardous uncontrolled 
energy source on mine sites. However, it was the involvement of loaders and the inadequate 
utilisation of PPE and SWPs that were identified as the fatality causation factors that require 
immediate improvement throughout the industry to yield improved safety performance.  
Gender, age, level of production, depth of operation and mining method were all found to have 
had no discernible impacts on fatality rates. 
The necessity to communicate this fatality information, learn from it and rapidly evolve Safety 
and Health Management Systems on sites is the core conclusion reached. This requires that 
companies utilise fatality information as an auditing tool to continuously improve their Safety 
and Health Management Systems and site procedures every time a fatality occurs within the 
industry. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PROJECT BACKGROUND 
Over the last 139 years, there have been 1081 fatalities within Queensland’s metalliferous mines 
and quarries. In the last 50 years alone, spanning from 1966 to 2016, Queensland’s 
metalliferous mines and quarries experienced 146 fatalities (Devine, 2017). The unfortunate 
theme that becomes evident when examining Queensland’s mining fatalities is the fact that 
effectively all the fatalities were preventable. The recurrence of fatalities with common causes 
within the industry has also created concerns that mining companies are at times too slow to 
learn from historic fatal accidents and to update their sites’ safety and health management 
systems to prevent the recurrence of fatalities. The cycle of recurring fatalities can only be 
broken by learning lessons from past fatalities and by preventing the mistakes from being 
repeated. 
Mining safety and health legislation has the purpose of providing companies with a statement 
of the legal obligations and regulations that need to be adhered to, in order to ensure a safe 
working environment. Companies comply with legislation and therefore reduce the risks on 
their sites by documenting processes and procedures that are incorporated into the site’s safety 
and health management system (SHMS) (Devine, 2017). 
The evolution of Queensland’s mining legislation has historically been driven by the lessons 
learnt from fatalities and accidents within the industry. This is particularly true for coal mining 
legislation where major disasters that resulted in multiple fatalities directly influenced the 
legislation. The royal commission into the Mt Mulligan disaster was followed by the Coal 
Mining Safety Act 1925 and similarly, the inquiry into the second Moura explosion in 1994 
was followed by the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (Mine Safety Institute of 
Australia Pty Ltd, n.d.). These disasters had pronounced impacts on the coal mining legislation 
and the lack of disasters of the same magnitude within the metalliferous mining industry has 
generated concern that the legislation governing metalliferous mining and quarrying has not 
evolved to the same extent as the legislation of the coal mining industry, possibly putting the 
metalliferous industry at risk of an impending disaster.  
In Queensland, a company’s management and Site Senior Executive are responsible for the 
effective implementation of the SHMS on site. However, due to the vast variety of tasks carried 
out on site, individual risk assessments are also required to identify and manage all the risks 
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applicable to a specific task and this therefore ensures that the SHMS is applied to every 
situation. Risk assessments can also serve as an auditing process for the SHMS. If risks are 
identified, through risk assessments, for which the SHMS does not contain any documented 
provisions, this presents an opportunity to improve or update the SHMS (Devine, 2017). 
When the SHMS and risk assessments used on site fail to prevent a fatality from occurring, the 
causes of the failure need to be investigated. In the pursuit of zero harm, it is crucial that these 
fatalities are thoroughly assessed, analysed and the results reported, so that the knowledge 
obtained may be used to eliminate any deficiencies in the SHMS or the legislation. This newly 
gained knowledge should be used to continuously audit and amend the relevant legislation and 
safety and health management system to ensure that they remain effective and to ultimately 
prevent similar fatalities from recurring. 
This process can be described as a continuous improvement process which gets repeated every 
time a fatality occurs. 
1.2 PROJECT DEFINITION 
The safety of Queensland’s mining employees is a top priority at every mine site within the 
state. In the pursuit of zero harm, thorough analysis and communication of historical fatality 
data has an important role in evolving both the relevant mining legislation and a mine site’s 
safety and health management system. Devine (2017) states that: “Legislation is the law based 
on previous learning and community expectations on how best to avoid accidents and disasters”.  
Kletz (1993) states that the reason organisations keep repeating their own and others’ mistakes 
is due to inadequate utilisation and communication of past accidents. He suggests that to 
improve safety and to improve corporate memory, historical accidents need to be systematically 
analysed and the lessons learnt need to be communicated to all concerned. This process can be 
described as a continuous improvement process which gets repeated every time a fatality 
occurs. 
The purpose of this project is to provide useful information that can be used to learn from past 
fatalities and to aid the continuous improvement of mining legislation and SHMS.  
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1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
The aim of this project is to analyse historical fatality records to identify common activities, 
factors and hazards that contribute to the occurrence of fatalities by focussing on trends and 
clusters within the fatality data from 1986 to 2016.  
It is intended that the identification of past failures will urge companies to rapidly and 
continuously evolve their site SHMS to prevent the recurrence of these fatalities within the 
industry. This will provide the information that the minerals industry requires to break the cycle 
of fatality recurrence and lead to continuous improvements of site SHMS. 
To achieve the stated aim, the following objectives will be pursued for this project: 
• Substantial research will be conducted to identify the details surrounding the fatalities 
that occurred from 1986 to 2016; 
• Statistical analysis of the fatality data will be performed to determine whether any 
correlations exist between the fatalities and the investigated influencing factors; 
• The effectiveness of Safety and Health Legislation in reducing the occurrence of 
fatalities within the industry will be assessed; 
• Fatality data will be analysed to identify data clusters and trends that highlight key areas 
where safety performance improvements are required; 
• A comprehensive source of fatality related information that can be utilised for the 
continuous improvement of current Safety and Health Management Systems and 
legislation will be created; and 
• The fatality related information will be documented in a format that is easily understood 
and useful to potential users of the information. 
The information that result from the analyses will be used to make broad ranging 
recommendations for improvements to the industry’s safety performance. It will also serve as 
a knowledge database to be used by the mining industry to learn from previous failures and to 
prevent history from repeating itself. 
1.4 SCOPE 
This project is focussed on analysing fatalities that occurred over the last 139 years at 
metalliferous mines and quarries within the state of Queensland, Australia. 
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The following influencing factors will be analysed to establish whether any correlations with 
mine fatalities exists: 
• Sex and age of individuals; 
• Years of industry experience and years of training received by individuals; 
• Geographic location and size of mine; 
• Underground or surface operation; 
• Fatality occurrence during development or production activities; 
• Mining method employed and rate of production at time of fatality; 
• Commodity mined and mine site at which the fatality occurred; 
• Classification of the hazardous energy source that caused the fatality; 
• Involvement of equipment, machinery or plant in the incident; 
• Fly in fly out or residential classification of the deceased; 
• Time of day and day of week that the fatality occurred; 
• Number of employees in the industry; 
• Changes in legislation; 
• Contractor or company employed individuals; and 
• Depth of mining operations where fatality occurred. 
1.5 PROJECT SIGNIFICANCE AND RELEVANCE TO INDUSTRY 
The safety of Queensland’s mining employees is a top priority for the industry. This is 
demonstrated by the comprehensive safety programs implemented by various companies within 
the industry (Verra, Tate and Dryden, 2006). 
Mining companies have realised that safety management is not exclusively a financial burden 
and to the contrary, effective safety management plans can conversely result in financial 
benefits to the company implementing them.  
Ekevall, Gillespie and Riege (2008) identified various financial benefits related to improved 
safety performance and strong safety records, including: 
• Increased access to external capital; 
• Reduced litigation costs; 
• Reduced insurance costs and accident damage premiums; 
• Reduced production delays; 
• Preventing lost sales and reduced share prices resulting from a tarnished reputation; and 
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• Increased tendering success for mining contractors. 
The benefits of effective safety management also extend to political, trade union and 
community factors.  
Furthermore, the evolution of mining legislation and site SHMS depends on the knowledge 
generated from the analysis, interpretation and reporting of historic fatalities.  
Therefore, thorough analysis and interpretation of Queensland’s metalliferous fatal accident 
record will serve as a critical source of information to the minerals industry. This information 
can then be incorporated as inputs to address any deficiencies in legislation or the Safety and 
Health Management Systems of mine sites. The subsequent improvements to safety that could 
occur, would yield financial, political and community benefits to the stakeholders while also 
preventing recurrence of mining fatalities. 
1.6 PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
1.6.1 Project Risk Assessment 
The successful completion of this project, as with any project, is subject to avoiding the hazards 
and mitigating the risks that could affect its progress. In order to assess, identify and control 
any potential hazards that the project might face, a thorough risk assessment was performed. 
The risk assessment, included in Table 3, identified the hazards applicable to the project and 
used Tables 1 and 2 to establish the consequence and likelihood of the associated risks, while 
the matrix in Figure 1 provided the risk with a ranking. Once the risk was ranked, mitigating 
controls were proposed and the risks were re-assessed to determine their risk rankings after the 
controls were implemented.
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Figure 1. Risk ranking matrix (Campos-Rojas, 2016). 
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Table 1  
Risk matrix consequence definitions. 
Rank  Consequence Definition 
1 Catastrophic Irreversible, detrimental effects on time loss or report quality. The project is delayed past the due 
date for completion and minimum quality standard is not achieved 
2 Major Prolonged but reversible effects on time loss. The project is completed after the deadline to a low 
quality 
3 Moderate Short term detrimental effects on time loss or report quality. The project is completed within the 
deadline but to a lower quality 
4 Minor Minor short term effects on time loss or report quality. The project is completed within the 
deadline with minor losses in terms of quality 
5 Insignificant No detrimental effect on time loss. Quality is preserved. 
Source: Campos-Rojas (2016) 
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Table 2  
Risk matrix likelihood definitions. 
Rank Likelihood Definition 
A Almost certain The event is expected to occur in most circumstances (at least once per week) 
B Likely The event will probably occur in most circumstances (at least ten times per year) 
C Possible The event could possibly occur at some time (at least twice per year) 
D Unlikely The event could possibly occur at some time but is unlikely (at least once per year) 
E Rare The event may occur only in exceptional circumstances (less than once per year) 
Source: Campos-Rojas (2016) 
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Table 3  
Project risk assessment and proposed risk mitigation. 
Hazard Description Likelihood Consequence 
Risk 
Ranking 
Proposed Control 
Improved 
Likelihood 
Improved 
Consequence 
Improved 
Risk 
Ranking 
Technological 
Failure  
Analysis and/or report 
progress is lost due to a 
technological failure or data 
corruption 
C 1 Extreme 
Regularly save progress copies of all 
work in multiple locations (USB, 
cloud storage and external HDD) 
C 5 Low 
Extra-curricular 
responsibilities 
Responsibilities of role as 
president of the AusIMM 
Southern Queensland 
Student Chapter leads to 
time constraints 
B 3 High 
Manage time effectively by allocating 
hours towards thesis work and student 
chapter responsibilities every week 
C 4 Moderate 
Illness or injury 
complicating 
communication 
and/or progress 
Either student or supervisor 
becomes ill or gets injured, 
hampering discussions and 
report progress 
C 3 High 
Attempt to be at least two weeks 
ahead of schedule with thesis 
progress to reduce the impact that 
illness or injury could have on the 
thesis. Immediately advise supervisor 
and course coordinator of any serious 
or repeated illnesses or injuries. 
C 4 Moderate 
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Transportation 
complications/ 
traffic delays 
Supervisor and student 
meetings delayed due to 
considerable traffic between 
Deception Bay and the 
University of Queensland. 
Public transport delays or 
cancelled services 
B 4 High 
Plan transport routes in advance and 
utilised live traffic tracking software 
to ensure sufficient time for travel has 
been factored in. Determine whether 
alternative transport methods might 
be faster if delays are expected. 
C 4 Moderate 
Insufficient data 
Fatality data lacks the 
required detail needed to 
complete the project to the 
required standard 
C 2 Extreme 
Identify all data requirements early 
and develop a plan to contact external 
sources to obtain additional 
information. Alternatively, develop a 
plan in consultation with supervisor 
to work around data deficiencies 
D 3 Moderate 
Breach of 
confidentiality 
Additional data obtained 
from sources personally 
contacted by student might 
be subject to confidentiality 
requirements that would be 
breached by publication of 
the report 
D 2 High 
Clarify whether obtained data is 
confidential when obtaining it from 
sources. If confidentiality is 
applicable, contact Mechanical and 
Mining Engineering School to obtain 
advice on how to comply with 
confidentiality requirements. Save 
data files to secure locations only. 
E 3 Moderate 
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Supervisor 
unavailability 
Supervisor might be 
unavailable on certain days 
or might be out of town for 
periods of semester 
C 3 High 
Arrange key meeting times well in 
advance and communicate via email 
or Skype when physical meetings 
might not be possible 
D 5 Low 
Late submission 
Report might be submitted 
past the set deadline for 
multiple reasons 
E 1 High 
Plan project work completion date in 
advance of university deadline. 
Continuously upload draft versions of 
report. Continuously assess project 
progress to ensure key milestones are 
achieved and allocate additional time 
to project if progress is deemed 
insufficient according to 
predetermined Gantt chart 
E 3 Moderate 
Project submitted 
is of insufficient 
quality 
Project might not meet 
required criteria due to 
multiple reasons 
D 1 Extreme 
Complete tasks outlined in project 
criteria and seek feedback from 
supervisor prior to submission. 
Complete project work with sufficient 
time to perform quality assurance 
E 3 Moderate 
12 
Risk assessment 
becomes 
ineffective 
New risks are introduced to 
the project or controls 
become obsolete 
B 3 High 
Continuously review and if necessary 
update the risk assessment 
D 4 Low 
13 
 
All the risks identified and controlled for in Table 3 had their risk rankings reduced to either 
low or moderate rankings which are deemed sufficient for the purposes of this project.  
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1.6.2 Project Timeframe 
1.6.2.1 Project Milestones 
The successful completion of this project is dependent on a range of key tasks that will have to 
be completed as the project progresses. The key milestones applicable to this project are 
contained in Table 4. These milestones relate to tasks that are crucial to achieving the objectives 
of the project as well as tasks that will form part of the project’s formal assessments. 
Table 4  
Significant Project Milestones. 
Milestone Due Date 
Project Plan Agreement 1/06/2017 
Fatality database completed 7/08/2017 
Statistical analysis completed 25/08/2017 
Thesis Synopsis 8/09/2017 
Thesis Presentation Slides 26/09/2017 
Project Presentation 29/09/2017 
Examiner’s Copy of Thesis 09/10/2017 
AusIMM Proceedings – Conference Paper 27/10/2017 
Revised Copy Thesis 6/11/2017 
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1.6.2.2 Project Gantt Chart 
To highlight the importance of achieving the identified milestones and how they form part of 
the overall completion of the project a Gantt chart was produced, using the Gantt Project 
software program, that illustrates the project’s critical path and where the milestones are 
applicable to this pathway. Appendix B contains the output produced by the Gantt Project 
software. It illustrates the required activities that need to be completed along with the start and 
end date applicable to each activity. It also visually illustrates the activities identified in the 
form of a Gantt chart. 
The Gantt chart displays the required activities as grey bars with lengths equivalent to the 
estimated time required to complete the activities. The project milestones are displayed as 
diamonds while black arrows indicate the interdependencies of the project. There are two 
grouping brackets, one blue and one black, which indicate continuous formatting and editing 
as well as ongoing supervisor consultation respectively; these activities span over multiple 
months and will be undertaken alongside other activities throughout the project’s life. 
The project’s critical path has been identified; the critical path is highlighted in black and can 
be followed by observing the black diamond shaped milestones and black striped bars on the 
Gantt chart. The critical path follows the project report’s progression from the submitted 
progress report to the final, revised report that will be submitted to the project’s supervisor. The 
critical path, excluding assessment milestones, requires: 
• That the causes of the fatalities in the project’s database be researched; 
• Completion of the fatality database; 
• Statistical analysis of the fatality database; 
• Discussing the significance of the statistical findings within the context of the current 
regulatory framework; 
• Recommendations with respect to safety improvements and additional research 
requirements; and 
• Producing a high-quality report that communicates the project’s results. 
1.6.2.3 Contingency Planning 
Due to the significant importance of the activities that comprise the critical path of the project, 
these activities where allocated timeframes that exceed the expected time required to perform 
them. This was done in an attempt to mitigate the risks identified, should they occur. The 
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timeframes allocated to the critical path activities will allow ample time for the activities to be 
completed even if unexpected delays were to occur. 
There are no significant software or financial requirements for the completion of this project. 
Any additional data will be sourced online and statistical analysis will be performed with 
Microsoft Excel software which is widely available on all campus computers.
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 THE PURSUIT OF ZERO FATALITIES 
Darling (2011) writes that one of the most significant issues facing mine managers today is the 
objective of achieving a safe work environment, often described by the phrase “Zero Harm”. 
The phrase zero harm expresses the mission of most mining companies, contractors and mining 
employees when it comes to safety. Safety forms one of the five dimensions of sustainable 
mining, emphasizing the importance of preventing all mining fatalities; especially those 
fatalities that are related to recurring causes, to ensure the sustainable future of the minerals 
industry (Darling, 2011). The five dimensions of sustainable mining practices are illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. The five sustainable mining practices (Darling, 2011). 
The Minerals Council of Australia (MCA) strongly supports the pursuit of zero harm and 
reinforces its position by stating that “all mining fatalities are preventable” (MCA, 2017). The 
MCA defines its vision for mining safety as “An Australian minerals industry free of fatalities, 
injuries and diseases” and supports its vision by declaring that: 
• “All fatalities, injuries, and diseases are preventable; 
• No task is so important that it cannot be done safely; 
• All hazards can be identified and their risks managed; 
• Everyone has a personal responsibility for the safety and health of themselves and 
others; and  
• Safety and health performance can always be improved” (MCA, 2017). 
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The pursuit of zero harm is fundamental to the future of mining and is recognised by many 
authors and industry professionals, yet achieving zero harm seems to continually evade the 
minerals industry. While the occurrence of fatalities in the mining industry can be attributed to 
a range of factors including safety legislation, safety culture, company management, worker 
behaviour, human errors and natural disasters, it is expected that the industry would do 
everything in its power to learn from fatal accidents and prevent fatalities from recurring. It is 
only by ensuring that historical fatal accident information is available, understood and 
comprehensively analysed that adequate measures can be developed and implemented to 
prevent their recurrence. 
2.2 OVERVIEW OF QUEENSLAND’S CURRENT METALLIFEROUS MINING SAFETY 
AND HEALTH REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
In Australia, the major mining states have separate regulatory regimes governing the safety and 
health of workers in the minerals industry. This approach has been justified by the sufficiently 
different hazards, mine site cultures and circumstances surrounding mining operations in each 
state (Gunningham, 2005). Additionally, it is important to note that mining in Queensland is 
considered to be sufficiently different from other industries in the state to warrant its own 
statutes and regulations with respect to occupational health and safety. This implies that the 
enforcement of and inspection of mines’ compliance with the safety and health regulations are 
governed by mining specific legislation. In order to effectively analyse fatal accidents in the 
mining industry, it is important to have a sufficiently comprehensive understanding of some of 
the key concepts of the regulatory environment. 
2.2.1 Legislative Elements 
Metalliferous mining and quarrying in Queensland is governed by the Mining and Quarrying 
Safety and Health Act 1999 (QLD) together with the act’s accompanying regulation, the Mining 
and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2001 (QLD). Other safety and health aspects of 
mining governed by separate legislation includes explosive activities governed by the 
Explosives Act 1999 (QLD) and radiation aspects governed by the Radiation Safety Act 1999 
(QLD). 
Other statutory instruments include: 
• Guidelines issued by the Minister for Natural Resources and Mines under the Mining 
and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 (QLD) s. 63(1). These guidelines establish 
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methods for achieving an acceptable standard of risk for people working in metalliferous 
mines and quarries;  
• Directives issued by the Mines Inspectorate under the Mining and Quarrying Safety and 
Health Act 1999 (QLD). These directives are normally applicable to a specific mine or 
group of mines and are intended to reduce risk to an acceptable level; and 
• Letters issued by the Mines Inspectorate under the Mining and Quarrying Safety and 
Health Act 1999 (QLD). These letters are again typically applicable to a specific mine 
or group of mines. 
2.2.2 The risk management approach of current mining safety legislation 
The current Mining Safety Act is written in a manner that requires the management of risks to 
keep them at an acceptable level or as low as reasonably possible instead of prescribing specific 
technical requirements that are characteristic of historical prescriptive Acts. Joy (2004) states 
that the control of risks is required to comply with Occupational Health and Safety Acts, the 
Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 (QLD), Environmental Protection Acts and 
to protect mining companies from litigation resulting from accidents and fatalities. 
The risk-based approach is implemented via risk management which can generally be 
summarised by the following steps: 
• A scoping assessment is conducted to identify hazards associated with specific 
operations; 
• A qualitative or semi-quantitative risk analysis is performed to establish the magnitude 
of potential consequences as well as the likelihood of occurrence associated with the 
identified risks; 
• Decide on suitable measures for controlling, mitigating or eliminating the risks outlined;  
• Control measures are implemented;  
• Audits and a continuous improvement process assesses the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the controls in reducing and managing risks; and 
• An assessment of residual risks is performed (Poplin et al., 2008; Joy, 2004). 
The risk assessment process outlined above is in accordance with the intent for risk management 
established in AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009, the Australasian adopted international standard on risk 
management (Joy and Griffiths, 2007). The risk management process model, recommended by 
AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009, is illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Risk Management Process Model (Joy and Griffiths, 2007). 
 
The most common risk assessment techniques employed in Australia to manage mining risks 
are: 
• Informal risk assessments; 
• Job Safety/Hazard Analysis (JSA/JHA); 
• Standard Operating Procedures (SOP); 
• Preliminary hazard analysis (PHA); 
• Workplace Risk Assessment and Controls (WRAC); 
• Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP); 
• Fault Tree Analysis (FTA); 
• Event Tree Analysis (ETA); and 
• Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) (Joy, 2004). 
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2.2.3 Statutory bodies and positions 
2.2.3.1 Department of Natural Resources and Mines (DNRM) 
Compliance with Queensland’s metalliferous mining legislation is enforced by the Mines 
Inspectorate which is an administrative unit of the DNRM. The Mines Inspectorate:  
• Provides regulatory oversight;  
• Conducts routine inspections of all mines in Queensland;  
• Audits mining operations to ensure compliance with regulation;  
• Issues directives described in Section 2.2.1 of this report;  
• Deals with complaints related to safety matters;  
• Investigates serious injuries and deaths on mine sites; and  
• Prosecutes perpetrators of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 (QLD) 
(Bevan, 2008). 
The DNRM is also responsible for the Safety in Mines Testing and Research Station 
(SIMTARS), a safety focused research unit in Queensland. 
The department’s Executive Director of Safety and Health is also responsible for the Petroleum 
and Gas Inspectorate and the Explosives Inspectorate (Bevan, 2008). 
Queensland’s mine safety administration hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 4 with the exception 
that the department is now the DNRM. 
22 
 
 
Figure 4. Queensland’s mine safety administrative hierarchy (Bevan, 2008). 
2.2.3.2 District Workers’ Representative 
Representatives appointed by the Minister to fulfil specific health and safety roles in the mining 
industry which includes the role of investigating complaints made about mining safety (Bevan, 
2008). 
2.2.3.3 Mine Operator (typically the owners of the mining operation) 
Mine operators are responsible for implementing safety policies and practices at mine sites 
(Bevan, 2008). 
2.2.3.4 Site Senior Executive (SSE)  
The mine’s SSE is responsible for the mine’s operations and can conduct investigations into 
serious incidents on site (Bevan, 2008). 
2.2.3.5 Site Safety and Health Representative (SSHR) 
One of the mine’s employees who is selected by other employees and is tasked with inspecting 
and reviewing safety matters as well as investigating certain complaints about mine safety 
(Bevan, 2008). 
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2.2.3.6 Underground Mine Manager 
Manages underground mining aspects of the site’s operations. 
2.2.3.7 Supervisors 
Fulfil various safety oversight and management duties on site. 
2.2.3.8 Other Mine Workers 
All mine workers and visitors have safety obligations on site under the current legislation. 
2.2.4 Other relevant entities 
Relevant unions have the right to nominate individuals for certain statutory positions. They also 
form a crucial component during consultation processes, handle mine safety complaints and 
conduct training (Bevan, 2008). 
The Queensland Resources Council (QRC) is “an independent body representing the 
commercial developers of Queensland’s minerals and energy resources” (Bevan, 2008). The 
QRC can nominate individuals for certain statutory positions and forms a crucial component of 
the consultation processes related to mine safety matters. 
2.2.5 Potential Deficiencies in the Current Regulatory Framework 
To understand why certain fatalities keep recurring it is essential that the legal framework 
intended to prevent these fatalities is explored and well understood. In order to improve the 
regulations, mining fatalities need to be linked back to the mechanisms that were intended to 
prevent them from occurring to root out the vulnerabilities present in the regulation that might 
result in the recurrence of fatalities. 
In examining Queensland’s mining legislation, the requirement for a Safety and Health Act that 
is specific to the mining industry is justified by the perceived unique characteristics of the 
industry. It should however be questioned whether this separation from Safety and Health Acts 
applicable to other industries results in mining legislation that is susceptible to becoming 
outdated and lacks the potential improvements that would have resulted from fatalities that 
occurred in other industries. The aviation and medicinal industries are some of the most 
complex industries in terms of the hazards that are faced and the potential for human harm, 
however the level of controls implemented in the industries are of the highest standard. Mine 
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safety could potentially be improved be incorporating lessons learned in other industries if the 
harmonisation of the relevant Safety and Health Acts were to occur. 
It should also be noted that Queensland’s mine safety regulatory framework differs from the 
other mining states in Australia. These differences could potentially cause confusion for 
employees who relocate from one state to another. The MCA’s aim of reaching zero harm is a 
national initiative and the harmonisation of safety and health regulations from all the states into 
a Federal Act would encourage best practice nationwide and would seem like a possible 
progression towards zero harm in Australia’s mining industry. 
Bevan (2008) lists some of the critical comments often directed at Queensland’s safety and 
health regulatory framework. The author states that the compartmentalisation of the Mines 
Inspectorate that places it under the control of the DNRM raises the concern that the Mines 
Inspectorate might not act in an unbiased manner when dealing with the mining industry. He 
attempts to reinforce this speculation by stating that the “often-perceived lack of prosecutions” 
that are pursued by the Mines Inspectorate following fatalities in the industry provides evidence 
for his argument. This comment should however be considered with care since the contrast to 
the scenario described by Bevan would result in an industry where excessive prosecutions by 
the Mines Inspectorate would discourage professionals from taking up positions such as mine 
managers due to the fear of prosecution should a fatal accident occur. 
Bevan (2008) also notes that retaining mine inspectors with the required skill set and experience 
can be financially difficult due to the lucrative offers they receive to perform consulting services 
within the industry. 
 
2.3 PRESCRIPTIVE VS RISK-BASED LEGISLATION 
During the early 1990s, the Australian mining industry started investigating a new mining safety 
regulatory structure with the goal of reducing high fatality rates in the mining industry. This 
new structure was risk-based and derived from the “duty of care” based Robens-style legislation 
(Poplin et al., 2008). The current risk-based Queensland Mining Acts generally do not prescribe 
safety measures nor procedures; there are no checklists of technical requirements that can be 
ticked to ensure compliance (Bevan, 2008). The risk-based approach has been summarised in 
Section 2.2.2 of this report. 
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(Bevan, 2008) recognised substantial limitations existed in a prescriptive approach. His report 
noted that prescriptive legislation results in a mass of detailed and difficult to comprehend laws 
that are difficult to keep up to date and often fail to address all relevant issues. The report 
contrasts this with risk-based legislation which is flexible and innovative, establishing 
responsibilities in terms of requiring duty holders to take measures across the board and address 
new hazards as they emerge.  
Poplin et al. (2008) utilised data describing the lost-time injury rates for coal mine sites in the 
USA, Queensland and NSW to assess whether the change from compliance-based to risk-based 
regulation in Australia significantly improved safety performance relative to North American 
mines which had continued to rely on compliance-based regulation. In performing the analysis, 
the authors used generalised estimating equations (GEE) to assess the trends among the mines 
as the method is robust with respect to imbalances and missing data points. 
Poplin et al. (2008) used incident rate ratios (IRR) to account for confounding factors related 
to the size of the mine, the tons of coal produced and whether the mine is a surface or 
underground operation in an attempt to isolate the effect that the change in legislation had on 
the rate of injuries. The time trends for IRRs for the USA, Queensland and New South Wales 
are displayed in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Illustration of time trends in IRRs for the USA, QLD and NSW (Poplin et al., 2008). 
Figure 5 indicates observable reductions in the IRR trends for QLD and NSW while the IRR 
trend for the USA fluctuates around an approximately constant mean value of one. It should 
however be noted that risk-based Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (QLD) and the Coal 
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Mine Health and Safety Act 2002 (NSW) were enforced after the IRRs had already started 
reducing. Poplin et al. (2008) explained that risk management processes had progressively 
begun to be implemented at mine sites in the early 1990s before it was enforced by legislation 
a decade later. The implementation of risk-based processes over the years leading up to the 
official dates of the legislation seems to correspond to significant decreases in the injury IRRs 
for QLD and NSW while the USA, governed by compliance-based regulation, did not enjoy 
similar successes over the same period. 
Attitudinal surveys conducted by Laurence (2005) involving approximately 500 mine workers 
at 33 mines located in NSW, QLD and other international mine sites were also critical of 
compliance-based approaches to mine safety. Laurence discovered that increasing the 
magnitude of rules and regulations to cover every aspect of mining as well as developing 
detailed prescriptive regulations, safe work procedures and safety management plans failed to 
“connect” with mine workers, therefore failing to produce a safer mine environment. 
Joy (2004) corroborates the findings of Poplin et al. (2008) by stating that risk assessment and 
management has become an integral part of coal mining in Eastern Australia, contributing 
towards reductions in loss time injury frequency rates (LTIFR) from pre-1988 levels sometimes 
exceeding 200 to 2004 levels of less than 20 LTIFR. 
The full effects and performance of risk assessments in the mining industry have not yet been 
objectively measured and reported, however the attitude towards risk assessments and feedback 
from all levels of the mining industry have been positive (Joy, 2004). 
2.3.1 Criticism expressed about risk-based legislation 
One of the issues that arises when dealing with risk-based legislation is the issue of what exactly 
constitutes an acceptable level of risk. Contrary to prescriptive legislation, it can often be more 
challenging to objectively prove whether an acceptable level of risk had been maintained and 
whether the Act had been breached (Bevin, 2008). 
The article written by Poplin et al. (2008) presents intriguing findings with respect to the 
possible correlation between risk-based legislation and reductions in injury incident rates. It 
should however be noted that the article does have its limitations. The first limitation noted is 
that even if correlation exists, it does not necessarily equate to causation. Additionally, the 
classification of what constitutes a reportable lost time injury is inconsistent among mine sites. 
Comparing the statistics for lost time injuries across countries, introduces high possibilities that 
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the standards for reporting such incidents will vary considerably among the sites investigated. 
It is for this reason that this report will instead investigate mining fatalities as the classification 
of what constitutes a fatality is a universal measure. 
Poplin et al. (2008) also acknowledges that the legislation governing mining in the United States 
is considered to be a hybrid between risk-based and prescriptive legislation instead of being 
classified as an outright prescriptive-based act. 
The article by Poplin et al. (2008) should be analysed within its context, as it only investigated 
coal mines. For the purposes of this report, Queensland’s metalliferous mines will be 
investigated and analysed in an attempt to establish whether a similar reduction in incidents is 
observed over the period that Queensland transitioned from a prescriptive-based act to a 
risk-based act. The measure of success will however be linked to the occurrence of fatalities 
instead of lost time injuries. 
Finally, while the benefits of risk-based legislation seem to be apparent, mine sites face the 
difficult task of ensuring that risk mitigating measures such as risk assessments are consistently 
performed with due care. The risk exists that over time employees can become complacent in 
performing these risk assessments with the risk mitigating technique being reduced to a routine 
instead of a conscious attempt to reduce risk to an acceptable level. 
2.4 THE ABSENCE OF MINING DISASTER INFLUENCE AND PRINCIPLE HAZARD 
MANAGEMENT PLANS FROM LEGISLATION FOR METALLIFEROUS MINES  
One of the most noticeable differences between the coal and metalliferous mining industries in 
Queensland is the fact that historical, multiple fatality mine disasters have almost exclusively 
been limited to coal mines. These mine disasters have major impacts on public perception of 
the mining industry, political actions and legislative changes (Verra, Tate and Dryden, 2006). 
Table 5 includes mining disasters that had significant impacts on the mining industry. 
Table 5  
Queensland mining disasters and their impacts on the industry. 
Year Disaster Description Impact 
1921 Mount Mulligan Colliery 
Dust explosion resulted in 
77 fatalities 
Resulted in the 
enactment of distinct 
legislation to govern coal 
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and metalliferous mines 
respectively. Mines 
Inspectorate was divided 
into Metalliferous and 
Coal Inspectorates 
respectively. 
1972 Box Flat No. 7 Colliery 
Large scale explosion 
resulted while an attempt 
was made to put out an 
underground fire, claiming 
18 fatalities 
Mine rescue protocols 
were updated 
1975 Kianga No. 1 Mine 
Spontaneous combustion 
led to underground 
explosion resulting in 13 
fatalities 
Legislation was 
significantly altered and 
SIMTARS was 
established. 
1986 
Moura No. 4 
Underground Coal Mine 
A flame safety lamp 
triggered an underground 
explosion which resulted in 
12 fatalities 
Significant changes to 
emergency egress 
framework, committee 
tasked with determining 
the minimum training 
requirements for coal 
mines was established 
and flame safety lamps 
were prohibited 
1994 
Moura No. 2 
Underground Coal Mine 
Spontaneous combustion 
resulted in underground 
explosion, claiming 11 
fatalities 
Updates to gas 
monitoring protocols, 
alterations to emergency 
escape facilities, 
requirement for statutory 
certificates to be assessed 
periodically, requirement 
for mine safety 
management plans 
incorporating risk and 
hazard analysis and a 
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review of the Mines 
Inspectorate. 
Source: Verra, Tate and Dryden (2006) 
The improvements detailed in Table 5 were accompanied by safety improvements that resulted 
from recommendations made by the Mining Wardens Court and Coroners Court (Verra, Tate 
and Dryden, 2006).  
The disasters listed in Table 5 had significant impacts on Queensland’s mining legislation in 
general, however the coal industry certainly underwent the most significant overhaul. The fact 
that these disasters were limited to the coal mining industry raises the question of whether the 
legislation regulating metalliferous mining and quarries in Queensland has been improved and 
refined to the same extent as the legislation governing the coal mining industry. The 
consequences of an inferior metalliferous mining legislation could translate to an increased 
possibility that a disaster affecting Queensland’s metalliferous mining industry could occur. 
A direct comparison of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 (MQSHA 1999) 
(QLD) and the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (CMSHA 1999) (QLD) yielded the 
following substantial difference: 
2.4.1 CMSHA 1999 Division 3, Section 63 
The CMSHA 1999 (QLD) makes provision for a “Principal hazard management plan” in 
Division 3, Section 63 of the Act. This section requires the site’s safety and health management 
system to include a principal hazard management plan capable of: 
“(1) A principal hazard management plan must— (a) identify, analyse and assess risk associated 
with principal hazards; and (b) include standard operating procedures and other measures to 
control risk.” 
The section also requires that the SSE “…give a copy of the principal hazard management plan 
to a person that employs persons at the coal mine whose work is affected by the plan’s 
requirements” 
Failure to comply by the SSE can result in a maximum penalty of 200 penalty units. 
The CMSHA 1999 (QLD) defines a principal hazard as a hazard with the potential to cause 
multiple fatalities. 
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A principal hazard management plan is a very notable omission from the MQSHA 1999 (QLD) 
which directly relates to a mine’s requirement to manage hazards that could result in multiple 
fatality mine disasters. This could possibly be reminiscent of the fact that coal mining 
legislation has been shaped significantly by disasters. A report by the Department of Mines and 
Petroleum (2014) discovered that the majority of fatal accidents in Western Australian mines 
were caused by a relatively small number of accident types which highlighted the importance 
of principle hazard management plans. 
It could be argued that the MQSHA 1999 (QLD) requires that all hazards have their associated 
risks reduced to an acceptable level, however the omission of a section on principal hazard 
management could result in a less diligent assessment of hazards that are particularly relevant 
to mass casualty mine disasters. 
 
2.5 FATALITY CAUSES 
Every mining fatality that occurs is unique and subject to case-specific factors, regulatory 
context and circumstances (Quinlan, 2014). Mannan (2013) states that the main aim of accident 
and fatality research should be to understand accidents to prevent them from recurring. The 
author continues to explain that attempting to understand an accident is often primarily equated 
to identifying the cause of the accident. In order to simplify the extensive historical database 
analysed in this report to a more manageable and meaningful information summary, the 
fatalities need to be categorised. The categories selected need to be adequately specific to 
provide meaningful information about the fatalities contained within each category and 
simultaneously, the categories need to remain broad enough to ensure each category contains 
sufficient fatalities to justify statistical analysis. 
In an attempt to identify categories that could possibly be utilised to summarise the data, Table 
8 in Appendix C was constructed by identifying common fatality causes from literature and 
referencing the amount of times the fatal cause was identified by different authors.  
A report published by the Department of Mines and Petroleum on fatalities in the Western 
Australian mining industry, investigated mine fatalities in Western Australia that occurred 
between 2000-2012. The report identified the causes of accidents in accordance with trigger 
events which are included in Table 8 (Department of Mines and Petroleum, 2014). 
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The NSW Department of Planning and Environment’s Division of Resources and Mining 
(DPEDRM) releases monthly incident summaries that categorise incidents and potential 
incidents according to causal factors that are described in Division 2, Section 145 of the Mine 
Health and Safety Regulation 2007 (MHSR 2007) (NSW). The Mining and Quarrying Safety 
and Health Act 1999 (QLD) has a similar list of high potential incidents contained in Schedule 1 
of the regulation. The mentioned legislative documents identify incident causal factors that are 
included in Table 8. These incident causal factors are not specifically intended to classify 
fatality causes, however they are useful in identifying hazards that could result in fatalities and 
for this reason, they are often used in reports related to mining fatalities. 
Additionally, the New South Wales DPEDRM has published an incomplete database of 
international mining fatalities that classifies the fatalities contained within the database 
according to “Agent of Fatality”. This report was published with a disclaimer informing the 
reader that the report was produced by engineering students undertaking internships with the 
NSW DPEDRM. Therefore, the agents of fatality disclosed in this report were screened to 
exclude categories deemed too vague for consideration. The agents removed and the reason for 
exclusion are outlined in Table 6. 
Table 6  
Agents of fatality excluded from analysis. 
Agent of fatality filtered Reason for exclusion 
Catastrophic failure 
Any number of failures can be classified as catastrophic, making the agent too 
ambiguous 
Other explosion Not related to a particular identifiable event 
Uncontrolled release of 
energy 
The majority of fatalities are related to trigger events that involve uncontrolled 
releases of energy 
Unintended operation of 
equipment 
Operation of equipment in a manner that results in the fatality of a mine worker 
will be classified as unintentional for any incident that does not have criminal 
motivation 
In addition to the exclusion of the agents in Table 6, the following assumptions were made in 
relation to the agents identified by Noon and MacNeill (2008): 
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• “Fall of Roof/Sides/pit wall” was separated and considered as “rock or ground fall” or 
“Pit wall failure”; and 
• Drowning was included in the category “immersion in liquid”. 
The United States Department of Labour’s Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) 
publishes data summaries that classify fatalities in metalliferous mines in the USA according 
to 18 different accident types. These fatality classifications have also been included in Table 8. 
Mining fatalities can virtually always be attributed to some form of energy in the form of a 
hazard that triggered the fatal incident. Joy (2004) writes in an article that “damage cannot occur 
without the unwanted release of energy”. The author then provides a list of energy sources 
typically used to identify hazards or for the purposes of this report, to identify fatal incident 
causes. The list is as follows: 
• Gravity; 
• Electrical; 
• Mechanical; 
• Chemical; 
• Pressure; 
• Thermal; 
• Radiation; 
• Biomechanics; and 
• Biological (Joy, 2004). 
Quinlan (2014) writes that the mechanisms resulting in mining fatalities have been known for 
“hundreds of years” and are well documented. The author then lists eight hazards which have 
been included in Table 8 and referenced to Quinlan. During the author’s investigation, he 
considered mining fatalities from five different countries, including Australia, that occurred 
between 1975 and 2011. Quinlan identified ten patterns that were repeated in the identified 
fatalities and recommended the following categories for classifying the causes of mining 
fatalities: 
• “Design, engineering, technical and maintenance failures; 
• Warning signs that were ignored; 
• Failures in risk assessment; 
• Failures in management systems and hazard management plans; 
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• Failures in auditing; 
• Economic pressures compromising safety; 
• Failures in regulatory oversight and inspection; 
• Workers and others expressing concerns prior to incident; 
• Poor management – worker communication and trust; and 
• Emergency and rescue resources and procedures” (Quinlan, 2014; Quinlan, 2016). 
These pattern causes identified by Quinlan (2014) appear to take a step back from the trigger 
events associated with the fatalities and instead focused on the root causes responsible for the 
fatalities occurring. This approach would be highly effective in identifying areas in SHMS that 
require additional due care to prevent fatalities. However, determining the categorisation of 
historical fatalities based on the root causes could be problematic due to a lack of available 
information. Establishing the root cause that led to a fatality in addition to the trigger event 
could provide significantly important information to the mining industry if the information were 
available. 
The causal factors identified in the reports, books and articles discussed above were collated 
and disclosed in Table 8 along with the reference sources for each category. 
When examining Table 8, it becomes apparent that there are multiple ways of categorising the 
causes of mining fatalities. Electrocution, ground fall, inrush and fire were all referenced five 
or more times. Additionally, Joy (2004) recommends the use of energy sources while Quinlan 
(2014) suggests ten root causes in terms of control failures. 
The available literature seems to indicate that while there is not one single, most effective 
method for analysing mine fatalities, each fatality can be assessed from at least three different 
perspectives. The first perspective is the most primary, focussing on the form of uncontrolled 
energy that was released when the fatality occurred; this method can classify the majority of 
fatalities into one of nine categories listed by Joy (2004). The second perspective involves 
categorising fatalities according to the mechanism that embodied the energy source or the 
trigger event leading to the fatality. This perspective can become very broad and includes the 
causes identified in Table 8. The third perspective of analysis follows Quinlan’s root cause 
approach and requires that the failed control measure or the absence of a control measure be 
used to classify the fatality. Quinlan (2014) states that this can be done for the majority of cases 
by considering ten different patterns that lead to fatalities. 
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Each method of fatality categorisation has its own benefits and difficulties. Perspective one 
could be useful in determining where risk assessments failed to identify potentially fatal 
hazards. Perspective two allows mines to identify high risk areas that have inadequate controls 
and are often involved in fatal incidents. Perspective two is most likely the easiest perspective 
to communicate to the workforce. The third perspective is very useful in determining where 
management or certain control measures might have failed to prevent a fatality. 
Perspectives one and two will be extensively used to identify fatality causes in this report. The 
categories identified by these perspectives that indicate the highest potential for resulting in 
fatalities will then be examined more extensively from the third perspective to establish where 
control measures or management might have failed in preventing the fatalities. 
2.5.1 Equipment Related Fatalities 
The use of mining equipment offers mining companies various benefits, such as improving 
work efficiency and effectiveness, reducing the requirement for the manual operation of tasks 
and increasing the amount of production achievable (Horberry, 2011). Effectively every mining 
operation in Queensland and Australia incorporates the use of some form of equipment and 
mining equipment is continuously evolving, often introducing new hazards to the industry. 
Joy (2004) notes that when mining technology changes, it often involves major hazards. It is 
therefore no surprise that equipment related fatalities represent a significant contribution to 
industrial scale fatalities.  
Burgess-Limerick and Steiner (2006) state that mining equipment operated and maintained on 
site have considerable and diverse energies associated with them. The authors warn that a loss 
of control over these energies commonly result in injuries or fatalities to mine workers. Annual 
deaths involving workplace machinery, appliances, tools and equipment exceed 200 fatalities 
per annum on average (Horberry, 2011). 
Collisions involving large mobile equipment are still common occurrences within the mining 
industry. Additionally, vehicle interactions and incidents involving pedestrian and vehicle 
interactions are significant contributors to Australian mining fatalities, comprising 35 % and 
53 % of national fatalities respectively despite the increasing reliance on proximity warning 
and collision detection systems.  
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Equipment collisions are not only detrimental due to their contributions to mining fatalities but 
also pose significant financial costs to companies due to the repair requirements and lost 
production (Horberry, 2011). 
The mining industry constantly requires new mining equipment to increase productivity by 
being larger, operating faster and having increased power capabilities. These requirements lead 
to a complex balancing of safety performance with productivity requirements, often leading to 
increases in the likelihood and severity of associated injuries and fatalities (Horberry, 2011). 
Zhang, Kecojevic and Komljenovic (2014) established that 21.6 % of mining equipment related 
fatalities in the United States (US) resulted from haul truck incidents. The authors analysed 
their data by assessing possible correlations with the victims’ age and experience as well as 
investigating the possible influences of the location of the haul trucks and the activity they were 
conducting at the time of the fatalities. It was found that haul trucks moving forward on haul 
roads were responsible for the most fatalities at surface mining operations in the US. Zhang, 
Kecojevic and Komljenovic also assessed the incidents to determine the root cause of each 
incident. The root causes identified by the study are represented in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Table of root causes for haul truck related incidents at mines in the United States (Zhang, Kecojevic and 
Komljenovic, 2014). 
Mining fatality literature seems to be dominated by fatalities related to mining equipment. As 
mining has become more mechanised over the years, it would seem that mining equipment has 
become one of the primary sources of fatalities on mine sites. 
The literature seems to indicate that haul trucks are the main perpetrators when it comes to mine 
fatalities however it should be analysed within the inherent limitations that most studies 
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considered coal mines and the majority of literature assessing correlations between mining 
equipment and mine site fatalities considers data obtain from mines in the United States.  
In order to assess whether the hazards identified by the various authors related to mining 
equipment usage are applicable to Queensland’s metalliferous mines, a thorough analysis 
focussing specifically on the involvement of equipment in the fatalities at Queensland mine 
sites will be undertaken. 
3 FATALITY DATA ANALYSIS 
3.1 DATA COLLECTION AND DATABASE CREATION 
This project is based on a thorough analysis of data pertaining to metalliferous mining and 
quarrying fatalities in Queensland. Before any meaningful analysis could be performed, 
substantial amounts of supplementary data in addition to the primary data base utilised had to 
be obtained. 
In order to analyse the fatalities within context and to consider the contributing factors and the 
circumstances surrounding the incidents, mining warden inquiry reports were used to 
investigate the fatalities from 1986 to 2001. Warden inquiry reports for fatalities post 2001 
could not be obtained and therefore a range of alternative supplementing sources of information 
were used to study the fatalities in more detail. 
A database of information that lists various parameters relating to the fatalities that occurred 
from 1986 to 2016 was subsequently created, Appendix A. 
3.2 ANALYSIS DIFFICULTIES 
This analysis investigated two particular periods of fatality data. The period from 1879 to 2016 
included the entire fatality record available at the time of writing. This period was analysed for 
overall trends and to assess the limited number of parameters that were available for all the 
fatalities.  
Performing a detailed statistical analyse on the entire dataset for this period would be extremely 
difficult due to the fact that detailed information related to the fatalities is not publicly available. 
Even news articles for fatalities prior to 1989 are very difficult to find.  
37 
 
An additional issue to consider is the relevance of the data to the modern industry. It is highly 
likely that fatalities that occurred in the 1800s were subject to overwhelmingly different safety 
management, legislation and differing best practice environments. It was therefore assumed that 
the more recent fatalities would represent the best indicators of current issues within the 
industry that would urgently need to be addressed. 
Considering the abovementioned factors, fatality data encompassing 1986 to 2016, which 
relates to 15 years prior to and 15 years post the implementation of the Mining and Quarrying 
Health and Safety Act 1999 (QLD) was analysed in depth to determine the most relevant issues 
still contributing to industry fatalities in the current safety environment.  
During this 30-year period there were 62 fatalities that occurred. Due to the small sample size 
and the nature of the sample data, meaningful, traditional statistical analysis was not possible 
on such a small sample. The destructive nature of the sample data also meant that it was 
impossible to obtain more sample points. The nature of the sample data meant that insufficient 
data was a good indication as it points to fewer fatalities. 
3.3 ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
The data was analysed to identify trends and clusters of data that displayed common hazards, 
causation factors and critical activities related to the fatalities. This approach was successfully 
employed by the Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (2014) on a smaller 
sample size than the 62 fatalities being investigated for the purposes of this report. 
The fatalities were investigated to consider the effects of over 21 parameters, identified in 
Section 1.4 of this report, in order to identify the focus areas where improvements in mining 
safety might be required. A lack of available information made it impossible to assess the effects 
of certain parameters on the fatalities within Queensland’s metalliferous mining industry, 
however additional contributing factors were discovered during the analysis process. 
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4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 EMPLOYMENT AND ANNUAL FATALITY RATES 
Annual total employment and total fatality rates are characteristics for which data is available 
dating back to 1879. The analysis commenced with an investigation of the relationship between 
the number of individuals employed annually within Queensland’s metalliferous mining and 
quarrying industry and the number of fatalities that occurred annually within the industry. This 
is illustrated in Figure 7, on the next page, for the period encompassing 1879 to 2016.  
Upon visual inspection, it becomes apparent that from 1879 to approximately 1964, the total 
annual fatalities represented by the blue line seems to fluctuate with the level of annual 
employment in the industry represented by the orange bars. The statistical correlation for the 
period from 1879 to 1964 was calculated to be 77.36 % while the standard deviation for the 
annual total fatalities over the same period was calculated to be 7.68 fatalities. It would seem 
that during this period the number of fatalities within the industry were heavily related to the 
number of individuals employed within the industry. Since numerically every employee in the 
industry has a probability to potentially be involved in a fatal accident, it is up to the 
implementation of legislation and risk management processes to reduce that inherent 
probability. The substantial correlation prior to the 1964 Act in Figure 7 however seems to point 
towards poor risk mitigation and safety performance during this period.  
The solid red line on Figure 7 indicates the implementation of the Mines Regulation Act 1964 
(QLD). The timing of the implementation of this act seems to correspond to a very important 
change in the relationship between the annual employment levels and total fatality rates within 
the industry. Post the implementation of the Act, the correlation between the level of 
employment and fatality rate noticeably decreases, highlighted in the graph by the fact that the 
trend of the annual total fatalities, indicated by the red dotted line, continues to decrease after 
the implementation of the 1964 Act despite the level of employment fluctuating and even 
increasing over the same period. This would seem to indicate that the metalliferous industry’s 
safety performance improved substantially after the implementation of the Mines Regulation 
Act 1964 (QLD). 
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Figure 7. Relationship between annual fatalities and annual level of employment. 
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To investigate whether the implementation of the current risk-management based legislation 
might have had a similar positive influence on the safety performance of the industry, the 
relationship between industry employment levels and fatality occurrence rates was re-examined 
by focussing the analysis on the 30-year period encompassing 1986 to 2016. Figure 8, on the 
following pages, was created to illustrate the relationship between the annual fatalities in the 
industry and the annual level of employment from 1986 to 2016.  
Examining the graph in Figure 8, it becomes evident that the trendline representing the annual 
fatalities continues to decline over the 30-year period and seems to reach a plateau at a single 
fatality per year in the most recent years. An important observation is made however when the 
period prior to the implementation of the 1999 Act is compared to the period post the 
implementation of the Act. The standard deviation of the total annual fatalities decreases from 
2.58 fatalities prior to the Act to 1.06 fatalities post the Act. 
The decrease in the standard deviation of fatalities coincides with the timing of the 1999 Act’s 
implementation in 2001. This seems to indicate that not only has the risk management based 
legislation positively impacted the industry by continuing the decline in annual fatalities, shown 
by the trendline, but additionally it seems to have also substantially decreased the amount of 
variation in the total annual fatalities that occurred within the industry. It should be noted that 
the decreasing trendline and variation of annual fatalities is observed over a period of time when 
the level of employment in the industry continues to fluctuate and even has a noticeable spike 
during 2010-2015.  
Focussing on the relationship between employment and fatalities for most recent years, 
spanning 2007 to 2016, the annual fatality occurrence seems to have reached a plateau in terms 
of improvement. Averaging a single fatality a year is an admirable achievement for the industry 
but it still eludes the goal of zero fatalities. The plateauing effect is confirmed by Figure 9 which 
shows the cumulative fatalities for the industry from 1877 to 2016 and by Figure 10 which 
illustrates the normalised fatality rate per 1000 employees from 1879 to 2016. Both Figures 8 
and 9 indicate that improvements in the annual fatality rates have reached a plateau at a single 
fatality per year. 
To consider how the plateau described above might be breached to further improve the safety 
performance of the industry, it is useful to consider what has occurred historically and to learn 
from these events and processes. In the late 1960s, the safety performance of mines in the UK 
had reached a similar, albeit higher value, plateau in fatality occurrence under the then 
prescriptive safety legislation. This prompted the commissioning of the Robens report which 
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suggested that the prescriptive legislation be replaced with risk-management based legislation. 
It was this progressive approach to safety improvement that breached the fatality plateau and 
substantially improved the safety performance of the industry. Queensland’s metalliferous 
mining industry seems to have reached another plateau in fatality occurrence rates and a new 
progressive strategy is now required to progress the industry even closer to the ultimate goal of 
zero fatalities. 
An important consideration to bear in mind for this analysis is that correlation does not 
necessarily indicate causation and therefore the decreases in fatality trends and variations, while 
seemingly perfectly coinciding with the implementation of the various Acts, might be 
attributable to other factors that are less obvious and observable. The alignment of the timing 
of these changes with the implementation of the highlighted Acts provides a strong argument 
that the legislation has indeed been effective in achieving improved fatality performance both 
in terms of occurrence and variation. 
It should also be noted that for this analysis, no employment data was available for the years 
1877, 1878 and 1912. Subsequently these years were omitted from all analysis except for Figure 
9 which illustrated cumulative fatality data.
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Figure 8. Relationship between annual fatalities and annual level of employment for 1986 to 2016. 
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Figure 9. Cumulative amount of fatalities from 1877 to 2016. 
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Figure 10. Normalised annual fatalities per 1000 employees for 1879 to 2016.
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Additional, simple descriptive statistics for the annual level of employment and the annual 
number of fatalities within the industry are contained in Table 7. 
Table 7  
Descriptive Statistics of employment and fatality data for 1879 to 2016. 
The date groupings of the information contained in Table 7 were selected to emphasize the 
potential influences of the Mines Regulation Act of 1964 (QLD) and the Mining and Quarrying 
Safety and Health Act 1999 (QLD). 
From the information in the table it should be noted that the average amount of annual fatalities 
decreased from 10.06 before the Mines Regulation Act 1964 (QLD) to 2.98 after the Mines 
Regulation Act (QLD) despite average employment levels increasing from 7933 to 10730 
employees over the same time period. A similar result was observed for the Mining and 
Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 (QLD) with average annual fatalities decreasing from 
2.41 to 1.53 per year prior to and post the implementation of the Act despite annual employment 
levels increasing from 9951 to 12518 employees over the same time period. 
The maximum amount of fatalities to occur within a single year also decreased from 30 prior 
to the Mines Regulation Act to 12 post the Act and a decrease from 10 fatalities in a single year 
prior to the 1999 Act’s implementation to 4 post the implementation is observed. 
These statistics seem to strengthen the argument that the implementation of these Acts have had 
profound impacts on the safety performance of the industry and are very likely the reason for 
the improvements noted in the fatality trends and variation too. 
 1879-1964 1964-2016 1986 - 2001 2001 - 2016 Total 
Average Fatalities 10.06 2.98 2.41 1.53  
Average Employees 7,933 10,730 9,951 12,518  
Max Annual Fatality 30 12 10 4  
Amount of Zero Fatality Years 1 4 3 1 5 
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The requirement for further improvements to the industry’s safety performance is justified by 
the observation that over 137 years there have only been 5 years where no fatalities were 
experienced. 
Employment numbers over the period increased from 8476 in 1986 to 11438 employees in 
2016. That equates to a 34.95 % increase in the number of people employed in the industry 
although it should be noted that during the 2010 to 2015 period the industry saw a spike in 
employment reaching a maximum of 16765 employed persons in 2013/2014. 
4.2 WORKPLACE CHARACTERISTICS 
4.2.1 Commodity 
Figure 11 illustrates the number of fatalities that occurred within the industry, classified by the 
commodity that was being mined when the fatality occurred. From the chart, it can be seen that 
the commodities copper-gold and zinc-lead-silver were the largest contributors to the fatalities 
that occurred during the period. To establish the potential reasons why so many fatalities 
occurred while mining these commodities, it is necessary to consider whether the majority of 
the fatalities occurred at different mine sites or at the same mine site. This is explored in the 
next section. 
 
Figure 11. Fatalities for Different Commodities 1986 to 2016. 
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4.2.2 Mine Site 
After considering the fact that most fatalities seem to be related to the mining of copper-gold 
and zinc-lead-silver ore bodies, the fatalities were assessed to determine at which mine sites 
they occurred. This helped determine whether the frequently occurring fatalities classified in 
Figure 11 were attributable solely to the type of commodity being mined or whether site 
performance played a more important role in determining the cause of these fatalities.  
Figure 12 illustrates the number of fatalities that occurred at each metalliferous mine site over 
the 30-year period from 1986 to 2016. Examining the graph, it is clear that the majority of mine 
sites had contributed only a single fatality over the 30-year period. There are however six sites 
namely: Cannington, Mount Isa, Highway-Reward, Cracow, EPM-Cloncurry and Tick Hill that 
were responsible for more than a single fatality each. Mount Isa in particular had seen 21 fatal 
accidents occur at its operation over the 30-year period.  
The sheer scale of the operation at Mount Isa is a possible explanation for the rate of fatalities. 
Another possible influencing factor is the fact that the Mount Isa operation includes 
concentrators and smelters that present additional hazards and accounted for 6 of the 21 
fatalities that occurred at the site. It is concerning that over the 30-year period analysed, certain 
accident were repeated multiple times at the Mount Isa operations.  
Section 4.5.2 of this report discusses equipment related fatalities and highlights that no less than 
four loaders have fallen into open stopes resulting in four fatalities over the period from 1986 
to 2016. Three of the loader incidents occurred at the Mount Isa operation with the fourth 
occurring at the Mount Isa owned George Fisher mine. There can be various reasons for the 
fact that these incidents were repeated and the specific circumstances surrounding each incident 
were slightly different however this statistic reinforces the importance that should be placed on 
learning from incidents and improving site controls and processes in a timely manner to prevent 
the recurrence of fatalities. 
It is difficult to determine whether the change in ownership resulting from Mount Isa Mines 
being acquired by Xstrata and then by Glencore had resulted in improvements to the site’s 
health and safety management system but it would non the less benefit the site to rapidly update 
and evolve their SHMS when fatalities occur to ensure every effort is made to reduce fatalities 
at the site. 
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The fatalities related to the mining of copper-gold ore bodies are spread across multiple sites 
and seem to indicate that the influencing factor is more likely the multitude of copper-gold 
mines operating in Queensland rather than the fault of a particular site. 
 
Figure 12. Fatalities at Different Mine Sites in Queensland. 
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Queensland also experienced six quarry related fatalities from 1986 to 2016 that occurred at the 
following sites: 
• Bracalba Quarry; 
• Roseneath Quarry; 
• Wongabel Quarry; 
• Castle Creek Quarry; 
• Tichum Creek Quarry; and 
• Moranbah South Quarry. 
The causes of the fatalities that occurred at the quarries did however not indicate any substantial 
data concentrations nor common causes that could be analysed for such a small sample. 
Two fatal incidents that occurred during exploration activities were excluded due to being 
related to an aircraft accident. 
4.2.3 Surface vs Underground 
Figure 13 illustrates a comparison of fatalities that occurred on the surface vs fatalities that 
occurred underground for the period encompassing 1986 to 2016. 
 
Figure 13. Number of fatalities by location from 1986 to 2016. 
With the exception of the surface fatality quantities showing slightly more fluctuations and 
variation than the underground fatality quantities, there does not seem to be any other 
discernible patterns inherent in the fatality location data in Figure 13. 
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Of the 62 fatal accidents, 28 were underground and 34 were surface based. Over the period, 
there were approximately 9 % more employees working at surface operations compared to 
underground operations. Even when the fatality data had been normalised with employee 
statistics, surface fatality incidents were still 1.1 times or 10 % more likely to occur than 
underground fatalities. 
The most likely explanation for the higher observed surface fatality rates is that the surface 
fatality data includes fatal accidents that occurred in processing plants, smelters and during 
exploration activities in addition to the fatalities that occurred during the extraction and 
development of the mine itself. It can therefore not conclusively be said that surface 
metalliferous mining should be considered to be more dangerous than underground 
metalliferous mining but it should be noted that the safety performance of modern underground 
mines no longer seems to lag behind that of surface mining operations. 
4.3 TIMING CHARACTERISTICS 
4.3.1 Day of the Week 
Figure 14 illustrates the days of the week that fatalities are most likely to occur based on the 
historical frequencies observed from 1986 to 2016. 
 
Figure 14. Fatalities for day of the week. 
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Figure 14 indicates that fatalities are most likely to occur on Tuesday or Wednesday, mid-week, 
and on Fridays, right before the weekend. A possible reason for the trends observed could be 
the fatigue and mental state of the employees. Employees might have a harder time 
concentrating mid-week as they are slightly fatigued from a few days’ work and their mental 
state might be affected by the knowledge that they still have a few days to go before the end of 
their rosters are reached. The high incidence rates on Fridays could possibly indicate a lack of 
focus due to employees’ mental conditioning to normally look forward to the weekend instead 
of maintaining all their focus on the task at hand. 
It is important to note however that the interpretation of the frequency of fatalities for specific 
days of the week will depend on the rosters and hours worked by employees. 
The time of day that fatalities occurred was also assessed but no observable trends nor clusters 
in the data relating to incident timing or day shift vs night shift were discovered. 
4.4 EMPLOYEE FACTORS 
4.4.1 Gender and Age of Deceased 
All incidents except for one involved males. The female accident was a female visitor who had 
been drinking at a hotel before her site visit and subsequently had a blood alcohol reading of 
0.086 gm/100 ml. She got out of the road-train in which she had travelled to the site, 
accompanying the driver, and proceeded to lie down next to it to “look at the stars”. The loader 
that was loading the truck subsequently drove over her (Kennedy, 2006). 
The age of the deceased individuals demonstrated no noticeable trends. 
4.4.2 Occupation of the Deceased 
Figure 15 illustrates the fatalities that occurred in the industry, categorised according to the 
occupation of the deceased individuals. Equipment operators represent the occupation that is 
most prone to the occurrence of fatalities. This is unsurprisingly due to the energy sources 
related to the operated equipment as well as the fact that mining equipment often operate in the 
most high-risk areas of a mine site.  
Manual trades represented the second largest portion of fatalities and involved boilermakers, 
fitters, shunters, timbermen, etc.  
The ‘other’ category involved a safety advisor, pilot, miners, unknown, visitor, etc. 
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Two incidents involving children were excluded from the data before the pie-chart was 
generated. The one child died as a result of a fire that engulfed a caretaker’s residence at the 
Bracalba Quarry while the other one was fatally injured when he was struck by a rock that fell 
from an excavation face while he was fossicking at the Mount Hay Tourist Mine 
(Devine, 2017). 
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Figure 15. Fatality by occupation 1986 to 2016. 
Drillers, 2Manual Trades, 9
Riggers, 2
Supervision Role, 2
Other, 22
Dump Truck Operators, 4
Grader Operator, 1
LHD Operator, 10
Plant Operator, 3
Nozzle Operator, 1
Jumbo Operator, 1
Other, 20
Fatalities by Occupation 1986 to 2016
Drillers Manual Trades Riggers Supervision Role Other Dump Truck Operators
Grader Operator LHD Operator Plant Operator Nozzle Operator Jumbo Operator
54 
 
4.4.3 Contractor Involvement 
Nelson (2017) wrote a comprehensive report analysing the involvement of contractors in 
fatalities that occur in the industry. Nelson discovered that contractors were more likely to be 
involved in fatal accidents and the most likely reasons for this seems to be the fact that 
contractors are often employed to perform very difficult and dangerous tasks on mine sites. 
Additionally, contractors that transfer between sites often do not obtain an in-depth 
understanding and appreciation for the Safety and Health Management System that is employed 
at the local mine sites. 
Nelson’s comprehensive study of contractor involvement in mining fatalities meant that no new 
patterns or contributing causes were identified during this study. 
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4.5 OTHER FACTORS 
4.5.1 Hazardous Energy Sources 
Section 2.5 of this report described how all fatal accidents can be attributed to a source of 
uncontrolled energy. Devine (2017) classified all the fatal accidents that occurred in 
Queensland’s metalliferous mining and quarrying industry from 1877 to 2016 according to the 
source of uncontrolled energy released that ultimately resulted in the fatal accident. Figure 16 
summarises the fatal accidents related energy sources for the period encompassing 1917 to 2016 
(Devine, 2017). 
 
Figure 16. Fatalities classified by source of uncontrolled release of energy 1917 to 2016 (Devine, 2017). 
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Figure 16 indicates that gravitational potential energy has posed the greatest risks to employees 
on mine sites since the early 1900s. Some hazardous energy sources, such as explosive and 
chemical energy, are very well controlled in modern mining environments and as a result they 
rarely result in fatalities anymore. Explosives are now subject to the Explosives Act 1999 
(QLD) which might explain the substantial improvements in the explosives’ safety performance 
observed in modern mining. Increases in the scale of mines have however resulted in large 
quantities of vehicles that are required to drive longer distances and interact with larger 
machinery on sites. It is therefore not surprising to note that vehicle related fatalities increased 
since the early 1900s. 
Figure 17 classifies the fatal accidents that occurred over the 30-year period from 1986 to 2016 
according to the source of uncontrolled energy released. Gravity continues to present the 
greatest source of hazardous energy on site even today, examples of how it influences 
substantial amounts of fatalities will be explored in the sections to follow. After gravity, both 
mechanical and vehicle related energies were the largest contributors to recent fatalities. 
Modern mines are very large in scale and highly mechanised which results in multiple 
mechanical and vehicle related energy sources that require adequate controls to be put in place. 
The large quantities of equipment on site and the interactions between these pieces of equipment 
and employees are major contributors to these statistics and are discussed in detail in 
Section 4.5.2. 
 
Figure 17. Fatalities resulting from uncontrolled energy releases 1986 to 2016. 
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Assessing the fatality data for safety performance improvements from 1986 to 2016, the data 
for the fatalities that occurred from 2002 to 2016 had to be normalised to determine whether 
improvements in controlling specific energy sources were achieved with the implementation of 
risk-management based legislation. Since 39 fatalities occurred from 1986 to 2001 and only 25 
occurred from 2002 to 2016, fatality data for each energy category within the 2002-2016 range 
was multiplied by a normalising factor of 1.56. This factor represents the ratio of total fatalities 
during 1986-2001 divided by total fatalities during 2002-2016.  
Figure 18 illustrates the normalised fatality data categorised according to the period of time in 
which they occurred. Examining Figure 18, it seems that gravity related fatalities continues to 
decrease while vehicle related fatalities are increasing and mechanical energy related fatalities 
remain approximately constant. The data would therefore seem to suggest that a concerted effort 
needs to be made by the industry to introduce more effective controls that prevent fatalities 
related to the uncontrolled release of energy from vehicles from recurring. 
 
 
Figure 18. Fatalities resulting from uncontrolled energy releases 1986 to 2016. 
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4.5.2 Equipment Involvement 
Consistent with the results in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.5.1, it was determined that for the 30-year 
period from 1986 to 2016 equipment was involved in 27 of the 62 fatalities or 43.6 % of all the 
fatalities that occurred in the metalliferous mines and quarrying industry. Although a variety of 
different equipment were involved, the piece of equipment most frequently involved were 
loaders. Loader related fatalities comprised 13 of the 27 equipment related fatalities or 48 % of 
all equipment related fatalities in the industry. 
In an attempt to uncover why loaders are involved in so many fatalities, the main causes of the 
fatalities are illustrated in Figure 19. The fatal causes include being crushed by a section of the 
loader, the loader overturning, the loader driving and falling into an open stope and collisions 
with pedestrians. Collisions with pedestrians was found to be the highest cause resulting in 
loader related fatalities while loaders overturning was determined to be the lowest cause of 
loader related fatalities. 
 
Figure 19. Main causes of loader related fatalities. 
 
A possible reason for the large number of fatalities resulting from collisions of loaders with 
pedestrians can be deducted from Figure 20. Figure 20 illustrates the main factors that 
contributed to loader related fatalities according to the investigation reports contained in the 
warden inquiry report (2014). Insufficient visibility, poor lighting, inadequate communication, 
inadequate signage and inadequate underground markings all contribute to impeding the 
awareness of the loader operators while performing their tasks. With the operators’ awareness 
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of the surroundings in which they operate being obstructed, the presence of pedestrians in that 
environment adds all the elements required for fatalities to occur. 
 
Figure 20. Factors contributing to loader related fatalities. 
 
It is also worth noting that in Section 4.5.1 it was determined that gravitational potential energy 
remains to most substantial hazardous energy source in the industry and this fact is highlighted 
by most of the fatality parameters investigated in this report. For the fatalities related to loaders, 
one of the most frequently occurring causes was loaders falling into open stopes. This has a 
clear relation to the gravitational potential energy present whenever you have a substantial 
difference in vertical elevation with no physical obstructions or barriers present. Any large 
opening, shaft, stope, orepass or bench is a potential candidate for causing a fatality.  
The mining industry is continuously progressing towards larger scale operations that also 
involves mining orebodies at greater depths. This progression results in larger benches, deeper 
shafts and more potential hazards. It is therefore imperative that the industry continuously 
evolves its risk management processes to ensure that these hazards are identified and controlled 
at a rate that exceeds the progression of the introduction of these larger vertical differences that 
result from the evolution of mining practices. The fact that no less than four loaders fell into 
open stopes in the last 30 years seems to indicate that the industry is at times too slow to learn 
from fatalities and to adapt their risk management processes to prevent the recurrence of these 
fatalities. This relates to Figure 20 that shows that incident investigation reports identified the 
need for physical barriers to be implemented four times in the last 30 years. 
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While performing the analysis it was noted that high potential incidents identified multiple 
occasions where loaders caught on fire due to the hydraulic pipes rupturing and the hydraulic 
fluid spilling onto hot components. While this has not resulted in any fatalities within the last 
30 years, the fact that it keeps recurring is worrying and seems to indicate a persisting issue that 
might be a ‘ticking time bomb’. The only way to achieve zero fatalities is by evolving our 
hazard controls at a faster pace than the evolution of the industry and the opportunity for high 
potential incidents to result in fatalities. 
4.5.3 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Breaches 
The hierarchy of controls dictates that PPE is the lowest or least effective form of risk control. 
There are unfortunately situations in the mining industry today where the utilisation of PPE can 
mean the difference between life and death. It is therefore unfortunate that given the importance 
of PPE, there were still multiple fatalities where the inadequate utilisation of PPE resulted either 
directly or indirectly in the occurrence of fatal accidents.  
Figure 21 illustrates four items of PPE that were highlighted in the investigation reports related 
to fatalities that occurred over the last 30 years where adequate utilisation of PPE may have 
prevented the fatalities from occurring. The effects of the hazardous gravitational potential 
energy is highlighted again with the inadequate use of fall arrest in the form of lanyards and 
harnesses comprising one of the main influences for the occurrence of fatalities.  
Due to the various tasks on a mine site that requires work to be done at substantial heights, it 
can be very difficult to control the risks related to these tasks with controls that rank higher on 
the hierarchy of controls than PPE and safe work procedures. It is therefore imperative that 
employees utilise fall arrest when performing these tasks. 
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Figure 21. Items of PPE not utilised that contributed directly or indirectly to fatalities. 
 
Figure 22 illustrates some of the fatal causes of accidents that stemmed from the inadequate use 
of PPE highlighted in Figure 21. By comparing the two figures, it can be deduced that the 
absence of gloves resulted in electrocution, the absence of a hard hat resulted in being fatally 
struck by flyrock, the lack of wearing a seatbelt contributing to fatal accidents and the improper 
or inadequate use of fall arrest resulting in employees falling to their death under the influence 
of gravity. 
 
Figure 22. Main causes stemming from inadequate PPE and contributing to fatalities. 
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4.5.4 Safe Work Procedure (SWP) Inadequacies 
Section 4.5.3 discussed how the inadequate employment of PPE, considered to be the least 
effective control in the hierarchy of controls, can contribute to mining fatalities. While 
analysing all the fatalities that occurred from 1986 to 2016, it becomes apparent that the 
administrative group of controls, considered to be slightly more effective than PPE, also exerts 
a substantial influence on the occurrence of fatalities. 
The analysis of the data revealed that 35 of the 62 fatalities or 56.5 % of all fatalities were 
influenced by inadequate utilisation or quality of the SWPs. Figure 23 illustrates the main issues 
with SWPs identified from fatality investigation reports. The most significant contributor was 
SWPs being deliberately ignored by employees. The exact reasons behind why the deceased 
individuals chose to ignore the SWPs will perhaps never be known. Investigation reports show 
that even individuals with years of experience in a particular role and an awareness of all the 
inherent hazards were still found to have breached SWPs with fatal consequences. 
Figure 23 indicates that the other issues related to SWPs were the fact that they were either 
non-existent or inadequate to control the hazards on site. Non-existent SWPs were often related 
to situations where an employee was performing a task that is very rarely required to be carried 
out. In other scenarios, a new task was being performed for the first time and therefore no SWP 
had been developed for it. 
In the case of SWPs being inadequate, the situation most often resulted from the fact that the 
procedures were not regularly audited to ensure they remained up to date and fit for purpose. 
Mine sites are complex and dynamic environments where the hazards associated with activities 
performed can evolve very rapidly due to small permutations on site. It is vital that SWPs are 
regularly audited and updated with employee input to ensure they continue to represent the best 
practice for safety purposes. 
63 
 
 
Figure 23. SWP related contributing factors to fatalities. 
 
4.6 OVERLAP BETWEEN CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 
Section 4 of this report has discussed multiple contributing factors that have impacted on the 
fatalities that occurred within Queensland’s metalliferous mines and quarrying industry dating 
back to 1879 but with a specific focus on the 30 years from 1986 to 2016. While all the factors 
that were discussed individually with some relations between sections drawn, it is important to 
consider that many of the fatalities were indeed impacted by multiple factors. It is not 
uncommon for a single fatality to involve a breach of an SWP, inadequate utilisation of PPE 
and be influenced by gravitational potential energy.  
Fatalities are often impacted by a multitude of factors but if major controls can be put in place 
for all the main issues identified in this report, it would result in multiple layers of controls that 
would surely improve the industry’s ability to inch closer to the ultimate goal of zero fatalities. 
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5 SUGGESTIONS 
The processes of capturing, reporting, distributing and communicating the information related 
to fatal incidents on site needs to be improved to ensure that every possible measure is taken to 
prevent the recurrence of fatalities in the industry. 
5.1 LOADERS 
Physical barriers need to be considered for vertical drops, such as open stopes, where the 
separation of individuals and the hazards are not possible. 
Improvements in awareness and automation needs to occur to remove individuals from 
dangerous environments. Proximity detection systems, larger and better located signs and 
markings need to be put in place and adequate lighting should be installed when loaders are 
required to operate near an open stope. 
5.2 PPE AND SWPS 
Non-compliance should not be tolerated by companies. A company culture should exist where 
the correct utilisation of PPE and SWPs are encouraged and praised instead of being tolerated 
for compliance purposes. 
Employees should receive adequate training both during initial inductions and as part of 
periodic refresher courses to equip them with the necessary skills required to identify hazards 
and perform adequate risk assessments before tasks are undertaken. This will add an additional 
layer of control that will prevent the occurrence of fatalities. 
SWPs should be audited and updated regularly with input from employees to ensure they remain 
effective and comprehensive enough to control all the hazards involved in the tasks they relate 
to. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
Safety on mine sites remains one of the key focus areas of the minerals industry. The issue of 
mining fatalities is often subject to immense political, social and economic pressures to achieve 
the ambitious goal of a fatality-free industry. The fatalities that receive the most criticism, are 
those that result from repeated mistakes, causes and control inadequacies; seemingly indicating 
that the minerals industry had failed to learn from historic fatalities and is too slow to evolve 
its safety systems. 
The common causes, activities and hazards resulting in recurring fatalities in Queensland’s 
metalliferous mines and quarrying industry have been identified and discussed in this paper, 
realising the stated aims of this project 
To contribute to the availability of fatal accident information, this report contains a table of 
information that highlights key influencing parameters, Appendix A, related to the fatal 
accidents that occurred in Queensland’s metalliferous mines and quarrying industry over the 
30-year period from 1986 to 2016. Key areas where the minerals industry can learn from 
historical fatalities and improve safety performance on site were highlighted by the analysis of 
the constructed database of information and the following key observations related to fatality 
data over the last 30 years were made: 
1. The most recent legislative acts seem to have had a positive influence on the industry’s 
safety performance. Annual fatality quantities displayed a 77.36 % correlation to annual 
employment levels within in the industry until the enactment of the Mines Regulation 
Act 1964 (QLD). After this act, the trend of annual fatality quantities has continuously 
decreased up to the present day. The enactment of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and 
Health Act 1999 (QLD), seems to have also reduced the variation of annual fatality 
quantities to a standard deviation of just 1.06 fatalities over the 15 years after the act 
was implemented. The effectiveness of the legislation seems to have contributed to 
annual fatality rates plateauing at a single fatality a year in the most recent years leading 
up to 2016. 
To breach the current fatality rate plateau and progress the industry closer to the zero-
fatality target, a concerted effort is required by the whole industry to effectively 
eliminate the recurrence of mining fatalities. This will only be achieved by making 
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fatality information readily available and by learning from the historical fatalities to 
ensure that every effort is made by the industry to prevent fatalities from recurring; 
2. Zinc-Lead-Silver and Copper-Gold were found to be the most fatal commodities mined 
accounting for 68 % of all fatalities. While Zinc-Lead-Silver seems to have been 
influenced substantially by the amount of fatalities at Mount Isa (21), the Copper-Gold 
fatalities seem to be resulting from the sheer magnitude of Copper-Gold mines in 
Queensland; 
3. Surface fatalities were discovered to be 10 % more likely than underground fatalities, 
likely owing to the fact that smelters and processing plants contributed to these figures; 
4. It was determined that Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Fridays represented the days of the 
week when the likelihood of a fatality occurring are the highest, accounting for 54 % of 
all fatalities. The reasons therefore seemingly relate to both the fatigue and mental state 
of the employees, with the anticipation of the weekend on Fridays and the realisation of 
mid-roster days likely affecting the concentration of employees; 
5. Mining equipment operators were found to be the occupation most at risk of fatal 
accidents accounting for 35 % of all the fatalities. Occupations related to manual trades 
were next accounting for 16 % of all the fatalities; 
6. Equipment was found to be involved in 27 or 43.6 % of all the fatalities analysed. The 
most lethal piece of equipment was determined to be loaders which accounted for 13 or 
48 % of all equipment related fatalities. The main causes of loader-related fatalities were 
individuals being crushed to death, trapped inside an overturned loader, falling into open 
stopes and collisions with pedestrians. The main factors contributing to these loader-
related fatalities were a lack of awareness by the operators and the absence of physical 
barriers at open stopes; 
7. Assessing fatal accidents in terms of the source of uncontrolled energy released, yielded 
that gravitational potential energy has historically been and remains the most fatal 
source of energy on site when not adequately controlled. Over the 30-year period from 
1986 to 2016, energy releases of a mechanical nature and those related to vehicles were 
also determined to have substantial impacts on fatality occurrence resulting in a 
combined 19 fatalities. During the same period, gravity alone accounted for 39 fatalities. 
The increasing scale and mechanisation of mines were determined to be contributing 
factors to the results; 
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8. PPE breaches were also found to have a substantial impact on mining fatalities, with 
inadequate utilisation resulting in 8 fatalities. The inadequate use of fall arrest and 
seatbelts were the most significant accounting for 6 of the fatalities; 
9. The administrative control measure SWPs were discovered to contribute to 35 or 56.5 % 
of all fatalities. This was attributable to SWPs being inadequate, non-existent or 
deliberately ignored by mine site employees; and 
10. Gender, age, level of production, depth of operation and mining method had no 
discernible impacts on fatality rates. 
While the effectiveness of the legislative Acts have substantially improved the industry’s safety 
performance, the statistics highlighted by the analyses identifies the aspects of the industry 
where further improvement can be achieved and it is recommended that the industry focus on 
eliminating these contributing factors. 
The main conclusion reached however is that the only way to learn from historical fatalities and 
break the cycle of recurring fatalities is by continuously analysing and communicating fatality 
information to the minerals industry. Industry then needs to utilise this information to rapidly 
and continuously evolve its Safety and Health Management Systems on mine sites to prevent 
mistakes and by extent fatalities from being repeated. 
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7 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Future research should be conducted to further update and improve the fatality database to allow 
more in-depth analysis to take place. This information needs to be available to the public in a 
centralised location that is simple to find and easy to utilise. 
The Department of Natural Resources and Mines could look at improving the availability of 
fatality data and perhaps create database software that can utilise keywords as inputs to find all 
the available statistics related to a specific issue. This would enable any member of the public 
to access a vast array of information related to multiple characteristics associated with mining 
fatalities. A database such as this would allow for efficient and effective access to information 
and simplify the process of learning from historical fatalities. 
A study similar to this one can be performed for the coal industry and perhaps for other states 
or countries to compare the results in an attempt to determine where Australia’s industry can 
learn from other industries that might be outperforming it in certain aspects. 
A more detailed investigation could be undertaken to supplement the findings of this report. 
The fatalities that were identified in this report could be analysed further to determine more 
intrinsic properties of the fatalities such as latent factors that contributed to the fatalities 
occurring. A bow-tie analysis can be performed for each fatality to determine what the 
outcomes beyond the loss of life were, how many controls failed in the lead up to the fatality 
and what effect the mitigating controls had. 
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9 APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A – PRELIMINARY FATALITY DATABASE 
Date Mine Name 
N
o. 
Gen
der 
Locatio
n 
Equipm
ent 
Involve
d 
Hazard
ous 
Energy 
Involve
d 
Event 
Contra
ctor 
Dept
h of 
Accid
ent 
Occupa
tion 
PPE 
Breach 
SWP 
Inadequate 
Incident Description 
Saturda
y, 22 
Octobe
r 2016 
Arch 
Mine 
Winton - 
MC 
95305 
Sidney 
Cuddy 
1 M Undergr
ound 
None Gravit
y 
Inundati
on/ 
engulfm
ent 
No 
     
Friday, 
13 
Februar
y 2015 
Ernest 
Henry 
Mine 
Jason 
Braid 
1 M Undergr
ound 
None Gravit
y 
Fall of equipment/ 
material  
1 km Grader 
Operato
r 
 
Y stood on 
drawpoint 
rill 
On 1 February 2015 a worker 
sustained hip and vertebrae 
injuries when he was struck by 
a rock which rolled down the 
sub level cave drawpoint rill 
which he was standing on.  He 
died in hospital while 
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recovering from his injuries 
on 13 February 2015. 
Wedne
sday, 
18 June 
2014 
Isa Mine, 
Mount 
Isa 
Brett 
Kelly 
1 M Undergr
ound 
None Gravit
y 
Fall of 
person 
 
1 km Timber
man 
 
Y alone 
near 
drawpoint 
Fatally injured when he fell 
into an ore pass. 
Wedne
sday, 6 
March 
2013 
Copper 
Smelter, 
Mount 
Isa 
Jordan 
Taurima 
1 M Surface Sump 
Pump 
Gravit
y 
Fall of 
equipme
nt/ 
material  
yes 
 
Laboure
r 
  
Fatally injured when he was 
struck by a pump being lifted 
out of a sump by a mobile 
crane. 
Sunday
, 26 
August 
2012 
Mount 
Moss 
Michael 
Cassidy 
1 M Surface Loader Vehicl
e 
Collision 
with a 
person 
  
Mining 
Supervi
sor 
  
Fatally injured when he was 
run over by a front-end loader. 
Tuesda
y, 5 
June 
2012 
Moranba
h South 
Quarry 
Sean 
Scovell 
1 M Surface None Mecha
nical 
Caught 
in nip 
point 
  
Plant 
Operato
r 
  
Fatally injured after becoming 
entangled in a conveyor. 
74 
 
Sunday
, 6 
March 
2011 
Opal 
Miner - 
Winton 
John 
Kovac 
1 M Undergr
ound 
None Gravit
y 
Inundati
on/ 
engulfm
ent 
  
Opal 
Miner 
  
An opal miner, working alone 
in old shallow underground 
workings, was fatally injured 
while removing mullock used 
to backfill a surface 
excavation that intersected the 
underground workings.  The 
material flowed and engulfed 
him.  
Saturda
y, 4 
July 
2009 
Roseneat
h Quarry 
Waaka 
Walker 
1 M Surface None Vehicl
e 
Rollover 
  
Truck 
Driver 
Y seat 
belt 
 
Worker truck tipped over and 
crashed when coming down 
haul road 
Tuesda
y, 19 
May 
2009 
George 
Fisher 
South 
Pekka 
Tuppura
inen 
1 M Undergr
ound 
Loader Gravit
y 
Fall of 
vehicle 
  
Loader 
Operato
r 
  
Fatally injured when loader he 
was operating fell into open 
stope. 
Monda
y, 18 
Small 
Quarries 
– 
Rockham
Adam 
Schultz 
1 M Surface None Gravit
y 
Fall of equipment/ 
material  
 
Mainten
ance 
Worker 
  
Fatally injured when struck by 
falling hopper door of a 
mobile crusher when he was 
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August 
2008 
pton 
(Castle 
Creek 
Quarry) 
preparing to remove the door 
from the crusher. 
Thursd
ay, 17 
January 
2008 
Canningt
on Mine 
Michael 
Auld 
1 M Undergr
ound 
LV and 
IT 
Vehicl
e 
Collision 
with 
another 
vehicle 
yes 375 
meter 
level 
Miner 
  
Fatally injured when crushed 
between a light vehicle and a 
man basket attached to a 
loader. 
Friday, 
15 
Decem
ber 
2006 
Canningt
on Mine 
Daniel 
Hensler 
1 M  Undergr
ound 
IT 
Basket 
Gravit
y 
Fall of equipment/ 
material 
350 
meter
s 
Trainee 
Diamon
d Driller 
  
Fatally injured when the main 
basket detached from the tool 
carrier and fell to the ground. 
Friday, 
27 
Octobe
r 2006 
Mineral 
Explorati
on Site – 
Far North 
Queensla
nd 
(Watersh
ed 
Noel 
Lovell 
1 M Surface None Vehicl
e 
Rollover yes 
 
Plant 
Operato
r 
  
Fatally injured when loader 
toppled on and crushed him. 
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Explorati
on 
Project) 
Thursd
ay, 27 
July 
2006 
Small 
Quarries 
– 
Mareeba 
(Wongab
el 
Quarry) 
John A 
Potter 
1 M  Surface Wheel 
Loader 
Vehicl
e 
Collision 
with a 
person 
  
Plant 
Operato
r 
 
Y swp not 
followed 
Fatally injured when run over 
by loader 
Monda
y, 27 
June 
2005 
Bracalba 
Quarry 
Lockyer 
Bray 
1 M  Surface None Therm
al 
Fire 
  
Child 
  
Died in fire in caretaker’s 
residence 
Wedne
sday, 
24 
Novem
ber 
2004 
Mount 
Norma 
Barry 
Cusack 
1 M Surface "Air 
Trac 
Drill" 
Gravit
y 
Fall of 
person 
  
Driller 
  
Fatally injured when he fell 
over face with his trac drill. 
77 
 
Friday, 
22 
Octobe
r 2004 
Mount 
Windsor 
Station 
Kerri-
Ann 
McDona
ld 
1 F Surface Loader Vehicl
e 
Collision 
with a 
person 
  
Visitor 
  
Fatally injured when she was 
struck by a front-end loader. 
Tuesda
y, 17 
August 
2004 
Highway 
Reward 
Mine 
Samuel 
Pugh 
1 M Undergr
ound 
None Gravit
y 
Fall of 
ground 
yes 370 
meter
s 
Miner 
  
Fatally injured when he was 
struck by a rock which fell 
from open stope into the 
drawpoint. 
Monda
y, 9 
Februar
y 2004 
Century 
Lead 
Zinc 
Mine 
Peter 
Marshall 
1 M Surface None Pressur
e 
Tyre rim 
failure/ru
pture 
  
Fitter 
  
Fatally injured when trying to 
remove a deflated outer rear 
tyre assembly from the truck 
when there was a sudden 
expulsion of air from the inner 
wheel.  This expulsion of air 
projected the outer assembly 
13 metres, striking the 
deceased. 
Friday, 
7 
Pajingo 
Gold 
Mine 
Lindsay 
Pope 
1 M Undergr
ound 
None Pressur
e 
Failure of pressure vessel 
(cylinder - hose - 
accumulator) 
Miner 
  
Fatally injured when he was 
struck on the head by a 
compressed air line or fittings 
from the air line while 
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March 
2003 
extending the line 
underground at the mine. 
Friday, 
13 
Decem
ber 
2002 
Highway 
Reward 
Mine 
Gordon 
Fogarty 
1 M Surface Loader Mecha
nical 
Crushed between a 
load and a structure 
porta
l 
Loader 
Operato
r 
 
Y did not 
follow swp 
Fatally injured when he 
became caught in the 
articulation point, between the 
cab and the front mudguard of 
an Elphinstone 2900 loader. 
Tuesda
y, 2 
July 
2002 
Mount 
Hay 
Tourist 
Mine 
Kelvin 
Hill 
1 M Surface None Gravit
y 
Fall of 
ground 
  
Child 
  
Fatally injured when he was 
struck by a rock which fell 
from the face of an excavation 
where he was fossicking. 
Friday, 
3 May 
2002 
Hadleigh 
Castle 
Mine 
Shane 
Michael 
Prowse 
1 M Undergr
ound 
None Gravit
y 
Fall of 
ground 
  
Miner 
  
Fatally injured when struck by 
a fall of rock at the face of the 
development heading while 
charging the face. 
Friday, 
14 July 
2000 
Mount 
Isa Mines 
- Lead 
Smelter 
Peter 
James 
Comerfo
rd 
1 M Surface None Mecha
nical 
Lifting Yes 2.23 
Crus
her 
Level 
Rigger 
  
Fatally injured when struck by 
a heavy load which fell from 
an overhead carne when being 
lifted. 
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Sinter 
Plant 
Tuesda
y, 27 
April 
1999 
Phosphat
e Hill 
Mine, 
WMC 
Fertilizer
s 
Sang 
Chul 
Kim 
1 M Surface None Gravit
y 
Fall of 
person 
   
Y fall 
arrest 
Y not 
following 
swp 
Fatally injured when he fell 
from the top of a sulphuric 
acid tank that was under 
construction. 
Monda
y, 23 
Novem
ber 
1998 
Mount 
Isa - 
Enterpris
e Mine 
Scott 
Robert 
Johnston 
1 M Undergr
ound 
 
Gravit
y 
Fall of 
person 
 
M62 Shaft 30B 
level 
Y fall 
arrest 
Y not 
addressed 
by Hazard 
manageme
nt plan 
Fatally injured when he fell 
from the deck of a sinking 
stage in a shaft. Likely he fell 
inwards through kibble hole 
with top section of safety rail 
missing. Did not wear a safety 
harness. 
Sunday
, 14 
Decem
ber 
1997 
Canningt
on Mine 
Phillip 
Anthony 
Fowler 
1 M Undergr
ound 
 
Electri
cal  
Electric 
shock 
yES 574 metre level 
 
P Fatally injured when he was 
touched on the neck by an 
electrode whilst arc welding 
in a crib. Did not wear 
protective gloves. Electrode 
holder foun to be defective. 
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Thursd
ay, 19 
June 
1997 
Mount 
Isa Mines 
- Scrap 
metal 
yard 
David 
Ronald 
Stratton 
1 M Surface Loader 
and tri-
axle 
trailer 
unit 
Mecha
nical 
Crushed 
between 
a load 
and a 
structure 
Yes 0 -Surface 
  
Fatally injured when he 
became caught between a 
tracked loader and a semi-
trailer whilst his truck was 
being loaded. 
Wedne
sday, 4 
June 
1997 
Mount 
Isa Mines 
- Deep 
Copper 
mine 
John 
Charles 
Barber 
1 M Undergr
ound 
LHD Gravit
y 
Fall of 
vehicle 
 
26 
level 
   
Fatally injured when the 
loader he was operating was 
reversed into a stope. No 
physical barriers, shift bosses 
did not inspect site. 
Inadequate lighting. 
Tuesda
y, 10 
Decem
ber 
1996 
Mount 
Elliot 
Mine 
Rick 
John 
Turnbull 
1 M Undergr
ound 
IT, not 
respons
ible 
Gravit
y 
Fall of 
ground 
 
1130 level 
 
Y 
unsupporte
d ground 
and lack of 
hazard/risk 
assessment
s 
Fatally injured when he was 
struck by a fall of ground 
whilst barring down in the 
Corbould slot drive. 
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Saturda
y, 23 
Novem
ber 
1996 
Selwyn 
Mine 
Brett 
Grant 
Duffie 
1 M Surface Forklift Gravit
y 
Fall of 
person 
 
0 - surface Y gloves Y Fatally injured when he fell 
from the forklift truck he was 
operating and it crushed him. 
Unit had no restraining 
device, inappropriate speed at 
time of fatality. 
Sunday
, 27 
Octobe
r 1996 
Mount 
Isa Mines 
- Deep 
Copper 
mine 
Barry 
Arnold 
Rooks 
1 M Undergr
ound 
Scissor 
lift 
tractor, 
not 
respons
ible 
Gravit
y 
Fall of 
ground 
 
M62 Conveyor 
Access 20C 
sublevel 
Y no 
lanyard/h
arness 
P Fatally injured from a fall of 
ground whilst installing rock 
bolts, insufficient ground 
support for access ground 
where rock was not competent 
Sunday
, 6 
Octobe
r 1996 
Mount 
Isa Mines 
- Lead 
mine 
Wayne 
Anthony 
Corry 
Jackson 
1 M Undergr
ound 
LHD Gravit
y 
Fall of 
vehicle 
 
17d sublevel of 16d8 stope Y Fatally injured when the 
loader he was operating fell 
into a stope. No spotter (Metal 
Regulation 1985 part 7.15), 
inadequate lighting 
Tuesda
y, 4 
Mount 
Isa Mines 
- Copper 
Glen 
Burrows 
1 M Surface – Copper 
Concentrator 
Gravit
y 
Fall of 
person 
 
0 - surface 
 
Y exposed 
ground 
without 
Fatally injured when he fell 
through the floor in the copper 
concentrator. 
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June 
1996 
Concentr
ator 
temp roof 
support 
Tuesda
y, 14 
March 
1995 
Mount 
Isa Mines 
Tony 
Daniel 
John 
Trevor 
1 M Undergr
ound 
Loco/tr
ucks 
Mecha
nical 
Crushed between a 
load and a structure 
5928 crosscut 
  
Fatally injured when he 
became crushed between two 
ore wagons in an underground 
workshop. 
Wedne
sday, 9 
Novem
ber 
1994 
EPM, 
Cloncurr
y 
B 
Carter; 
R 
Stalker 
2 M Surface Aircraft Gravit
y 
Fall of 
vehicle 
 
0 - surface 
 
Y Fatally injured when their 
aircraft conducting low level 
geophysical surveys crashed. 
Monda
y, 17 
Octobe
r 1994 
Tichum 
Creek 
Quarry 
Gavin 
John 
Milner 
1 M Surface Dump 
Truck 
Gravit
y 
Fall of 
vehicle 
 
0 - 
sufac
e 
   
Fatally injured when the dump 
truck he was operating fell 
over the quarry face. Hit 
highwall, was exceeding the 
speed limit 
Monda
y, 12 
Septem
Tick Hill 
Mine 
Kenneth 
Andrew 
Slater 
1 M Surface 
 
Explos
ives 
Flyrock 
 
0 - Low grade 
surface stockpile 
Y did not 
take 
shelter 
Y did not 
identify 
hazards, 
not 
Fatally injured when he was 
struck by flyrock from 
blasting that was being carried 
out in a stockpile area. 
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ber 
1994 
under 
excavator 
competent 
or qualified 
Multiple safety offences incl. 
incorrect transport of 
explosives, incorrect 
procedures followed, 
incompetent persons, 
incorrect controls. 
Wedne
sday, 
10 
Novem
ber 
1993 
West 
Moreland 
Mine 
Daile 
Alfred 
Coffison
; 
Geoffre
y Alan 
Schubert 
2 M Surface Helicop
ter 
Gravit
y 
Fall of 
vehicle 
Yes 0 - Surface 
exploration 
Y was not 
wearing 
seatbelt 
Y 
exceeding 
speed limit, 
road not 
wide 
enough 
Fatally injured when the 
helicopter they were in for an 
exploration drilling program 
crashed. Sling was attached to 
underside of helicopter, 
caught on drill rig and shot 
into roter. 
Friday, 
2 
Octobe
r 1992 
Tick Hill 
Mine 
Sean 
James 
Kenned
y 
1 M Undergr
ound 
LHD Mecha
nical 
Crushed 
between 
a load 
and a 
structure 
Yes 875 sill drive Y seatbelt Y 
exceeding 
speed limit 
Fatally injured when he 
became crushed between the 
lip of a loader bucket and an 
underground development 
face. 
Tuesda
y, 11 
Smacker'
s Knob 
Mine 
Peter 
Carl 
Daniel 
1 M Surface 
 
Gravit
y 
Fall of 
ground 
 
0 - Surface 
 
Y did not 
follow swp, 
did not 
Fatally injured when he 
became buried from a fall of 
rock from the face where he 
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June 
1991 
identify 
hazards, 
inadequate 
training 
was working, did not consider 
incompetent condition of the 
sandstone face. 
Wedne
sday, 
22 May 
1991 
Mount 
Isa Mines 
- Copper 
Concentr
ator 
Michael 
John 
Gorey 
1 M Surface 
 
Gravit
y 
Fall of 
person 
Yes 0 - Surface, Mullock Bin Y not 
observed or 
followed 
Fatally injured when he fell 
through an opening at the top 
of a bin. 
Tuesda
y, 14 
May 
1991 
Cracow 
Mine 
Anthony 
Mihalj 
1 M Undergr
ound 
sig 
machin
e/air leg 
Gravit
y 
Fall of 
ground 
 
NS 12 - e2 stope 
 
Y sling 
attached to 
the chopper 
Fatally injured whilst he was 
drilling blast holes and rock 
fell onto him, should have 
been using flatbacking to 
advance the stope North 
Sunday
, 21 
April 
1991 
Mount 
Isa Mines 
- Lead 
Smelter 
John 
Phillip 
Baira 
1 M Surface Crane Gravit
y 
Fall of equipment/ 
material  
0 - Surface 
 
Y no swp 
for working 
in bucket 
Fatally injured from burns he 
sustained form molten lead 
which spilt from the ladle 
when the hook became 
detached, locking bolt and nut 
failed or unscrewed. 
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Wedne
sday, 
13 
March 
1991 
Cracow 
Mine 
Jusuf 
Vrbic 
1 M Undergr
ound 
 
Gravit
y 
Inundati
on/ 
engulfm
ent 
 
No 6 draw point NS 12 ore 
body 
 
Fatally injured when a hang-
up in a draw-point collapsed 
on him. 
Thursd
ay, 7 
Februar
y 1991 
Mount 
Isa Mines 
- Lead 
Smelter 
David 
Anthony 
Kelly 
1 M Surface Water 
jet tank 
cleanin
g 
equipm
ent 
Gravit
y 
Fall of a 
structure 
Yes 0 - Surface, Gas cooling tower 
 
Fatally injured when he was 
crushed by falling steelwork 
when a tower collapsed. 
Saturda
y, 26 
January 
1991 
Mount 
Isa Mines 
Gary 
Michael 
Martin 
1 M Undergr
ound 
LHD Gravit
y 
Fall of 
vehicle 
 
R405 stope below 18b 
sublevel 
Y did not 
follow swp 
Fatally injured when he drove 
his unit through a warning 
barricade and fell into an open 
stope, unfamiliar with stope 
locations 
Friday, 
5 
Octobe
r 1990 
Greenval
e Mine 
Malcol
m Peter 
Wolfend
en 
1 M Surface Dump 
truck 
Vehicl
e 
Collision with 
another vehicle 
0 - Surface 
  
Fatally injured when the 
empty off-road dump truck he 
was driving skidded across the 
haul road and collided with 
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another truck causing him to 
be thrown from the cab. 
Thursd
ay, 4 
Octobe
r 1990 
Hilton 
Mine 
Martin 
Henry 
Rowlan
ds 
1 M Undergr
ound 
Jumbo Gravit
y 
Fall of 
ground 
 
KD51 incline 9a sublevel 
 
Fatally injured when a slab of 
rock fell from the side wall 
pinning him against the boom 
of a drill jumbo.  The rock bolt 
holes had been drilled, but the 
bolts had not yet been 
inserted. 
Wedne
sday, 
25 July 
1990 
Isa Mine, 
Mount 
Isa 
L J 
White 
1 M Undergr
ound 
 
Gravit
y 
Fall of 
person 
    
Y floor not 
fixed 
according 
to Aus 
Standard 
1657, no 
swp to 
perform 
task or 
measure 
completion 
Fatally injured whilst standing 
on a ladder which was hurled 
to the ground. 
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Monda
y, 4 
June 
1990 
Isa Mine, 
Mount 
Isa 
Thomas 
Douglas 
Lawrenc
e 
Anderso
n 
1 M Surface Loco/w
agon 
Gravit
y 
Fall of 
person 
 
0 - Surface, Gardenia Gate crossing Fatally injured when he fell 
and was run over by the first 
wagon of a cement train. 
Wedne
sday, 
15 
Novem
ber 
1989 
Horn 
Island 
Mine 
W 
Nellima
n 
1 M Surface LV/Ha
ul 
Truck 
Vehicl
e 
Collision with 
another vehicle 
0 - Surface 
 
Y did not 
follow swp 
Fatally injured when he was 
crushed in the cab of his 4WD 
when a CAT haul truck ran 
over his vehicle. 
Tuesda
y, 26 
Septem
ber 
1989 
Isa Mine, 
Mount 
Isa 
J 
Beavan 
1 M Undergr
ound 
Loco Mecha
nical 
Crushed between a load and 
a structure 
  
Y did not 
follow swp 
Fatally injured when he was 
crushed between flying rail of 
a loco and the wall of a cross-
cut while a rake of trucks was 
being loaded from a chute. 
Sunday
, 30 
Cracow 
Mine 
S Levy 1 M Surface LHD Vehicl
e 
Rollover 
    
Y did not 
follow swp 
Fatally injured when the 
loader he was operating left 
the road and overturned. 
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April 
1989 
Monda
y, 13 
March 
1989 
Mount 
Isa Mines 
Gregory 
George 
Nichols
on 
1 M Undergr
ound 
 
Gravit
y 
Inundati
on/ 
engulfm
ent 
 
N73 by-pass 19 
level 
  
Fatally injured when he 
became overwhelmed by a 
rush of fill whilst operating a 
load-haul dump. 
Thursd
ay, 5 
January 
1989 
Carpenta
ria Gold 
Mine 
D J Oats 1 M Surface 
 
Gravit
y 
Inundati
on/ 
engulfm
ent 
    
Y did not 
follow sw[ 
Fatally injured when he 
became trapped in a mill hole 
at the base of a ore stockpile. 
Friday, 
20 May 
1988 
Isa Mine, 
Mount 
Isa 
G 
Neville 
1 M Undergr
ound 
LHD Vehicl
e 
Collison 
with a 
person 
     
Fatally injured when he was 
run over by a Wagner ST5E 
LHD unit he had been 
operating. 
Tuesda
y, 9 
Februar
y 1988 
Isa Mine, 
Mount 
Isa 
W J 
Barry 
1 M Surface 
 
Electri
cal  
Electric 
shock 
    
Y did not 
follow swp 
Fatally injured when he was 
electrocuted when he placed 
his fingers in close proximity 
to live 6.6 kV wires. 
89 
 
Tuesda
y, 9 
Februar
y 1988 
Kidston 
Mine 
P Mayne 1 M Undergr
ound 
LHD Vehicl
e 
Collision 
with a 
person 
    
Y did not 
follow swp 
Fatally injured when he was 
run down by a Wagner ST5E 
unit. 
Monda
y, 17 
Februar
y 1986 
Isa Mine, 
Mount 
Isa 
J 
Pippenb
acher 
1 M Undergr
ound 
 
Gravit
y 
Inundati
on/ 
engulfm
ent 
     
Fatally injured when he was 
buried by a sudden rush of 
saturated fill whilst mucking 
de-slimed mill tailings. 
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APPENDIX B – PROJECT GANTT CHART 
 
Figure 24. Activities required to successfully complete project. 
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Figure 25. Gantt chart highlighting required activities and critical path applicable to the project.
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APPENDIX C – GENERAL FATALITY CAUSES 
Table 8  
Fatality causes identified by authors and legislation. 
Cause Identified 
Amount of sources 
identifying the cause 
Sources of identification 
Electrocution 6 
(Department of Mines and Petroleum; 
MHSR 2007; Noon and MacNeill, 2014; 
MQSHR 2001; 
MSHA, 2017; 
Quinlan, 2014) 
Rock/ground fall 6 
(Department of Mines and Petroleum; 
MHSR 2007; 
Noon and MacNeill, 2014; 
MQSHR 2001; 
MSHA, 2017; 
Quinlan, 2014) 
Inrush 5 
(Department of Mines and Petroleum; 
MHSR 2007; 
Noon and MacNeill, 2014; 
MQSHR 2001; 
Quinlan, 2014) 
Fire 5 
(MHSR 2007; 
Noon and MacNeill, 2014; 
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MQSHR 2001; 
MSHA, 2017; 
Quinlan, 2014) 
Pit wall failure 4 
(Department of Mines and Petroleum; 
Noon and MacNeill, 2014; 
MSHA, 2017; 
Quinlan, 2014) 
Explosion (Rock 
breakage agents) 
4 
(MHSR 2007; 
Noon and MacNeill, 2014; 
MSHA, 2017; 
Quinlan, 2014) 
Gas explosion 4 
(Noon and MacNeill, 2014; 
MQSHR 2001; 
MSHA, 2017; 
Quinlan, 2014) 
Loss of control of 
vehicle (including run-
aways, machinery) 
3 
(Department of Mines and Petroleum; MHSR 2007; 
MQSHR 2001) 
Escape of fluid under 
high pressure 
3 
(MHSR 2007; 
Noon and MacNeill, 2014; 
MSHA, 2017) 
Fall from heights 3 (Noon and MacNeill, 2014; 
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MSHA, 2017; 
Quinlan, 2014) 
Vehicle collisions 2 
(Department of Mines and Petroleum; 
MHSR 2007) 
Tyre Handling 2 
(Department of Mines and Petroleum; 
Noon and MacNeill, 2014) 
Asphyxiation 2 
(MHSR 2007; 
Noon and MacNeill, 2014) 
Uncontrolled issue of gas 
or fluid 
2 
(MHSR 2007; 
Quinlan, 2014) 
Failure of winding, 
haulage or lifting 
equipment 
2 
(MHSR 2007; 
MQSHR 2001) 
Immersion in liquid 2 
(MQSHR 2001; 
Noon and MacNeill, 2014) 
Inundation 2 
(MSHA, 2017; 
Quinlan, 2014) 
Equipment/Machinery 2 
(MSHA, 2017; 
Quinlan, 2014). 
Fall arrest failure 1 (Department of Mines and Petroleum) 
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Departure from OEM 
procedures 
1 (Department of Mines and Petroleum) 
Vehicle over edge 1 (Department of Mines and Petroleum) 
Overturning of vehicle 
(including machinery) 
1 (MHSR 2007) 
Fly rock 1 (MHSR 2007) 
Airblast 1 (MHSR 2007) 
Burial of machinery 1 (MHSR 2007) 
Structural failure of plant 1 (MQSHR 2001) 
Exposure to hazardous 
substance 
1 (MQSHR 2001) 
Contact with moving or 
rotating plant 
1 (Noon and MacNeill, 2014) 
Windblast 1 (Noon and MacNeill, 2014) 
Fall of material 1 (MSHA, 2017) 
Material Handling 1 (MSHA, 2017) 
Hand Tools 1 (MSHA, 2017) 
Non-powered haulage 1 (MSHA, 2017) 
Entrapment 1 (Quinlan, 2014) 
 
